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ABSTRACT 
 
TEPEDELENLI ALI PASHA AND THE WEST: 
A HISTORY OF HIS RELATIONS WITH FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN 
1798-1820 
 
DEMİR, İLKER 
 
M.A DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY 
 
THESIS SUPERVISOR: DR. EVGENIA KERMELI 
 
 
December 2007 
 
 
 This thesis analyzes the relations of Tepedelenli Ali Pasha with the Western 
powers namely France and Great Britain in the light of the Ottoman archival materials 
and European Travelers’ accounts. It scrutinizes the basic motives behind the 
conspicuous French and British interest towards the pasha and draws conclusions about 
his level of compliance with their policies regarding the Balkans. It also examines the 
traces of a possible connection between the Greek Independence movement and the very 
European policy of encouraging Ali Pasha for independence.  
 
 
Keywords: Tepedelenli Ali Pasha, Ayans, Ioannina, Epirus, Tepelen, Delvino, Albania, 
Klefts, Suliots, Greece, Derbents, Armatoloi, Rumelia, Septinsular Republic, Greek 
Revolution, Philiki Hetairia 
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ÖZET 
 
TEPEDELENLİ ALİ PAŞA VE BATI DÜNYASI: 
PAŞANIN FRANSA VE İNGİLTEREYLE İLİŞKİLERİNİN TARİHÇESİ 
1798-1820 
DEMİR, İLKER 
 YÜKSEK LİSANS, TARİH BÖLÜMÜ 
TEZ DANIŞMANI: EVGENYA KERMELİ 
 
 
Aralık 2007 
 
 Bu tez Osmanlı arşiv belgelerinin ve Avrupalı gezginlerin seyahatnamelerinin 
verdiği bilgilere dayanarak Tepedelenli Ali Paşa’nın İngiltere ve Fransayla ilişkilerini 
incelemektedir. Bu çalışmada İngiltere ve Fransanın Paşaya olan bariz ilgisinin sebepleri 
üzerinde durulurken Paşanın bu devletlerin Balkanlarla ilgili politikalarına ne derece 
uyumlu hareket ettiği konusunda bazı sonuçlara varılmaktadır. Ayrıca Yunan 
Bağımsızlık Hareketi ve Tepedelenli Ali Paşanın bağımsızlık yönünde teşvik edilmesini 
temel alan Avrupa politikalarının arasındaki muhtemel bağlantılar da sorgulanmaktadır.   
Anahtar Kelimeler: Tepedelenli Ali Paşa, Ayanlar, Yanya, Epir, Tepedelen, Delvine, 
Arnavutluk, Kleftler, Sulyotlar, Yunanistan, Derbent, Armatol, Rumeli, Yedi Ada 
Cumhuriyeti, Yunan İsyanı, Filiki Eterya 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 The rise of Tepedelenli Ali Pasha coincides with several extraordinary 
developments that could be labeled as milestones of both European and Ottoman 
history. This exclusive coincidence renders Ali Pasha‘s history a sort of historical 
crossroad where the growing tide of Ottoman decentralization, the roots of the 
Tanzimat reforms, the birth of nationalism and Philhellenism intersect with 
competing British, French and Russian imperialism. Therefore Ali Pasha’s history 
could be seen as a prism that reflects the ramifications of these various crucial events 
and phenomena from the periphery. However the key aspect of his political history, 
the conspicuous western interest towards him that ended up with a complicated series 
of diplomatic relations needs further clarification. This work aims to contribute to the 
studies concerning Ali Pasha by scrutinizing the subtle details of his fluctuating 
relations with Britain and France in which he could play his respective part 
disproportionate to his real power.  
 In the light of the Ottoman and Western sources this work examines the 
political power and role of the pasha within the international conjuncture of the late 
18th and early 19th centuries. Unlike the existing biographical and economy-oriented 
works emphasizing his estates and the revolt of the pasha this thesis solely aims to 
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expose the history of his almost forgotten relations with the Great Powers in the form 
of an analytical diplomatic history narrative. Accordingly it tries to reach insightful 
conclusions about his real political objectives and unfolds his concrete gains and 
losses. On the other hand European designs regarding his independence is discussed 
thoroughly by establishing analogies with the Greek Independence Movement. In 
this manner it examines the existence of a possible connection between the two 
projects relying on some primary sources and also inconsistencies or contradictions 
detected in European diplomatic maneuvers. The relations between the Porte and Ali 
Pasha are also portrayed in order to evince the nature of the conducted diplomacy.  
 The majority of the primary sources that have been utilized in this work 
belong to the Western historiography. The accounts of the consuls, adventurer 
travelers and personal servants of the pasha constitute a relatively rich mass of 
literature when compared to the limited number of Ottoman archival documents 
illuminating the concerned issue. However Ottoman documents under the Hatt-ı 
Hümayun and Cevdet classifications provide more definite and clear information 
about the relations of the Porte and Ali Pasha in particular. The Ottoman chronicler 
Ahmet Cevdet Pasha’s Tarih-i Cevdet and the accounts of Ali Pasha’s grandson 
Ahmet Müfid can be listed as the other significant Ottoman sources used. Among the 
western primary sources, the accounts of F.C.H.L Pouqueville, S.T Hughes, William 
Martin Leake, John Cam Hobhouse and Guillaumme Vaudoncourt adequately supply 
the necessary information to portray his background, political career and relations 
with the West. In fact most of the western literature about him was based on these 
principal works. Besides there are other useful accounts like Peter Oluf Brondsted’s 
Interviews with Ali Pasha, Richard Clogg’s The Movement for Greek Independence, 
1770-1821: A Collection of Documents and Napoleon’s Correspondance. The first 
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suffices to narrate the leading developments in the rise of the Pasha and the last two 
are fruitful in depicting the diplomatic relations and the question of the connection 
with Greek Independence. On the other hand some French and Austrian archival 
material were also used to shed light on the major developments related with Ali 
Pasha. When it comes to using secondary sources the western works have a further 
dominance. The most comprehensive works narrating the history of the Pasha are 
biographical novels like William Plomer’s Lion Of Ioannina and Marquis Diego 
Soria’s Ali Tebelen Pacha De Janina. For the issues of international politics it is also 
possible to utilize the vast academic literature about the Napoleonic Wars, Balkan 
History and the Eastern Question. Nevertheless A. Boppe’s L’Albanie et Napoleon 
and John W. Baggally’s Ali Pasha and Great Britain can be listed as the most useful 
and well organized secondary sources based on original British and French 
documents about Ali Pasha. Ottoman historiography also offers valuable sources 
though less in number like Prof. Uzunçarşılı’s Ottoman History series and his article 
on the Septinsular Republic.  
 The basic problem of using predominantly western sources on this issue is 
that they contain too much misinterpretations or false definitions due to language 
defects, ideological stereotypes like the constant reference to a mystified oriental 
despot image and exaggerated sanguine scenes. Firstly the narrators of them are not 
sufficiently familiar with the peculiarities of the Ottoman statecraft, traditions, 
language and terminology. It sometimes creates misinterpretations like the supposed 
appointment of a şeyhlülislam by the Pasha. Secondly the high frequency of the 
oriental despot stereotypes and the blatant subjectivity that constantly justifies the 
western cause, require additional caution and selectivity in reading. Moreover all 
western sources err in the chronological order of events. In fact no source follows a 
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proper chronological order and they sometimes give completely different dates for 
the same events. Lastly the majority of the western accounts are personal memoirs 
that gave the highest priority solely to personal impressions on the aspects of the 
pasha’s daily life, topographical descriptions and archeological surveys. Under the 
influence of the orientalist zeal many of the western authors seem to have paid more 
attention to the details of his seraglio, harem and riches. Besides the archeological 
expedition reports full of sketches, maps and inventories constitute the rest of the 
content in these sources. Hence the deduction of some critical details about the 
political developments is confined to few sources though there is a massive literature 
regarding him. 
 The method followed in the redaction is basically as such: Primarily it 
produces a general socio-political sketch of the Ottoman decentralization and Greek 
independence movement both of which shaped the political career of the pasha. 
Consequently it portrays the 18th century Ottoman Albania and Greece while tracing 
the deeds of the pasha in his struggle to enter into Porte’s service. The foreign 
entanglements of the Pasha are generally reflected with constant references to the 
European politics especially during the Napoleonic wars. The domestic ramifications 
of the rivalry between the great powers and the pasha’s conduct of policy towards the 
Porte were also repeatedly emphasized since both were the integral parts of the 
Pasha’s diplomacy. In the final analysis a conclusive balance of his foreign contacts 
is presented with a couple of general deductions from the history narrated in the text. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
 
AN OVERLOOK TO THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE FROM THE 
LATE SIXTEENTH TO EARLY NINETEENTH CENTURIES 
 
 
2.1 DISINTEGRATION AND THE RISE OF THE LOCAL NOTABLES 
AMIDST THE REIGN OF ANARCHY 
 
 The continuous dissolution of the central authority in the Ottoman Empire 
had started roughly in the late sixteenth century and reached its apex in the 
eighteenth century. 1So the traces of this transformation could be found even in the 
empire’s golden age. The circumstances that led to the gradual collapse of the socio-
economic order and central authority had its first major repercussions through the 
Celali rebellions in the late 16th and early 17th centuries.2 By the outbreak of this 
extensive turmoil the political, economic and social infrastructure of the Ayan 
institution started to mature.  In other words the developments after the Celali 
rebellions relatively donated the ayans the means to have their own military force, 
remarkable wealth and land tenure, namely the three basic pillars of their future 
political power in the empire. 
                                                 
1 Jane Hathaway, Problems of Periodization in Ottoman History: The Fifteenth through Eighteenth 
Centuries, Turkish Studies Association Bulletin 20 (1996): pp. 25-31 
2 Mustafa Akdağ, Türk Halkının Dirlik ve Düzenlik Kavgası, Celali İsyanları, Ankara 1999, p:283 
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 Starting from the late 16th century, the quick population growth and the 
penetration of massive amounts of American gold and silver triggered an intolerable 
level of inflation in Europe which infested through the Ottoman Empire too.3 The 
boom in the population enlarged the existing masses that sought fortune and benefit 
at the Porte’s service. This enormous potential turned to be a threat for the empire’s 
social and economic order since the empire entered a phase of stagnation also in 
terms of military expansion as well as economic. As the war machine stopped there 
were no longer adequate opportunities in military sphere to channel this mass.  As a 
result the financial crisis made it imperative to resort to constant devaluations of akçe 
during the late 16th and 17th century.4 Thus the minimization of the timar incomes 
due to devaluation inhibited the proper functioning of the system in terms of military 
provision and recruitment. Then the weakening of the timar system was to be 
balanced by the substitution of the sipahi, the traditional cavalry of the timar by 
Janissaries and sekban, the peasant mercenaries. Meanwhile peasants fled from their 
villages in excessively increasing numbers due to the destruction of the long-lasting 
wars, acute financial crisis and the lack of security. They either took refuge in the 
court of a local administrator or notable, serving as mercenaries or formed brigand 
groups. These peasant mercenaries together with the former timar holders who lost 
their status and wealth became protagonists of the Celali rebellions.5 In fact this 
extensive turmoil had several effects on the evolution of the ayan institution. Firstly 
                                                 
3 Ömer Lütfi Barkan, XVI. Asrın İkinci Yarısında Türkiye’de Fiyat Hareketleri, Belleten 34, 1970, 
p:25 
4 There is almost a consenus among the historians about an extensive financial crisis in Europe and 
Asia in the 16th and 17th centuries though their views about the most influential factors that shaped 
the course of this crisis. 
Please See: 
Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, New York, 
1972, V:I, P:398 
Şevket Pamuk, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Paranın Tarihi, İstanbul, 1999, pp:150-155 
5 Mustafa Akdağ, Türk Halkının Dirlik ve Düzenlik Kavgası, Celali İsyanları, Ankara 1999, pp:70-71 
   Karen Barkey,Eşkıyalar ve Devlet Osmanlı Tarzı Devlet Merkezileşmesi, İstanbul 1999,p:145 
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the provincial governors gained a decisive power enjoying the dissolution of the 
central authority by the collapse of the timar system and the Celali rebellions. 
Supported by the peasant mercenaries the provincial governors levied illegal taxes 
and oppressed the reaya. Their growing challenge and autonomy forced the central 
government to take measures to prevent the loss of authority and income. As a result 
the responsibilities of the governors in the collection of taxes from the miri mukataas 
imperial revenues were given to muhasıls special tax collectors.6 In addition has 
revenues of the sancakbeyis and governors were assigned to the imperial treasury via 
the muhasıls. As the post of muhasıl was mostly given to ayans they found an 
advantageous opportunity to rise to power. Apart from these the central government 
had to revise the imperial checks and balances system to restore his authority in the 
provinces. The traditional checks and balances system of the empire was based on 
the kadıs, local judges and defterdars, chief treasury officials who were the 
representatives of the central authority with immunity from the interference of the 
governors.7 Thus the sultan had the means to interfere directly to the affairs of the 
provinces via these two. But now the system was to be backed by an additional circle 
of power as it failed to curb the increasing autonomy of the governors. Ayans started 
to collaborate with the kadıs and to counterbalance the abuses of the governors by 
handing over their taxation duties, sending representatives and petitions denouncing 
about their deeds. On the other hand the existing petty ayans gradually became 
indispensable tools for crushing the Celalis.8 The massive levends, vagrant peasant 
groups seeking fortune as mercenaries provided a great source of manpower to the 
ayans as well.9 They enabled ayans to establish deterrent armed forces of their own 
                                                 
6 Halil İnalcık, Centralization and Decentralization In Ottoman Administration, p: 29 
7 İnalcık, p:26-28 
8 Yücel Özkaya, Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Ayanlık, Ankara 1977, pp:75-76 
9 Akdağ, pp:69-70 
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like the provincial governors. Thus the ayans were now responsible to defend their 
regions from the Celali attacks while enjoying the opportunities brought by them like 
the immense manpower and the erosion of the central authority.10 These private 
militias were a strong leverage for gaining wealth which would be the second pillar 
of the ayans’ future power and autonomy. Besides, the replacement of the sipahis by 
sekbans maximized the reliance of the central government on those local magnates 
for recruitment and provision services. In addition the need for cash to finance the 
new mercenary-based armies together with the extended Janissary corps required the 
elevation of the taxes on reaya.11 Not only the quantity but also the method of 
taxation had to be revised to provide enough cash for the central treasury. Enjoying 
this conjuncture the local magnates took over the taxation duties of the former 
sipahis. Hence the second pillar, wealth, which the ayans relied on for consolidating 
their authority became much more solid as the traditional timar system was dissolved 
by the advance of the tax farming iltizam system.12 By the 17th century extraordinary 
levies like the avarız akçesi, imdad-ı seferiyye and imdad-ı hazeriyye were also 
collected by the ayans in addition to the regular taxes.13 These tax collection rights 
granted a vast authority and a fruitful way of enrichment to the ayans.  
 Iltizam was already an integrated part of the traditional Ottoman land regime 
since the early days of the empire. 14As a complementary to timar, revenues of the 
imperial domains, customs and state monopolies were collected and channeled to the 
central treasury through tax farming. The revenue sources were divided into 
predetermined units, mukata’a and the right to collect the revenue of these mukataas 
                                                 
10 Özkaya, pp:80-81 
11 Özkaya, p:20 
12 Halil İnalcık- Donald Quataert,An Economic and Social History of The Ottoman Empire 1600-1914, 
V:2, pp:537-538,661-662 
13 Özkaya, p:23 
14 Linda Darling, Revenue Raising and Legitimacy:Tax Collection and Fiance Administration in the 
Ottoman Empire, 1560-1660, New York, 1996, p:119 
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was sold to individuals by auction. Within the iltizam system there was also another 
form of tax collection that had revolutionary effects on the rise of the ayans. Arpalıks 
the lands assigned to high officials as pensions were generally administered by 
deputies called voyvoda or mütesellim.15 They were responsible for all administrative 
services including the tax collection and preparation of the tax registers in the 
corresponding sancaks. The holders of these arpalıks began to choose mütesellims 
among the local ayans starting from the 17th century.16Having acquired these crucial 
posts, ayans established their influence in the provinces by employing their 
confidents, leasing their iltizam rights to other ayans, crushing the bandits and 
providing better administrative services than the appointed officials. 
 As the mukataas expanded at the expense of the timar lands the authority of 
the governors was challenged since mukataas were immune from their interference. 
Hence the reduction in the tax revenues, the limitation of their area of control 
together with the frequent shifting of their posts undermined the power of the 
provincial governors in time. The constant shifting of posts minimized the duration 
of a governor in one location. However the limited area and time for tax collection 
encouraged the governors to resort to corruption, illegal heavy taxes and oppression 
of the reaya. Since the posts were literally sold to the individuals offering the highest 
bid, the governors who purchased the posts were preoccupied with exacting as much 
tax as possible to be able amortize their investment and even make profit.17 As a 
result the heavy tax burden forced the peasants to appeal to the ribahors the private 
creditors who used to give loans by mortgage with high interest rates.18 Then a 
serious number of peasants had to leave their lands to those usuries. Not surprisingly 
                                                 
15 İnalcık, pp:32 
16 İnalcık, p:29 
17 İnalcık, pp:30-31 
18 Akdağ, pp:62-63 
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there were a large group of ayans among these ribahors and mortgage was a fruitful 
occasion to appropriate the former timar lands. Thus the land regime started to 
collapse in favor of the ayans opening the way for private land holdings. Now the 
ayans also resorted to illegitimate ways to appropriate vast lands of the former 
timars. They sometimes usurped those lands by force or purchased them by paying 
trivial prices.19  
 The basic hazard of the collapse of the timar system was twofold. Since the 
sipahis had administrative responsibilities like police duties, levying taxes, 
organizing irrigation and cultivation etc. apart from their military duties like 
providing troops and logistics almost the entire Ottoman state apparatus in the 
provinces suffered from serious debilitation. Then the corruption and tyranny of the 
officials sent from the capital gradually rendered the ayans as the protectors of the 
subjects the reaya.20 During the eighteenth century these positions became hereditary 
and the Porte often recognized them by granting official ranks and honors to be able 
to check their power within the imperial government system.  
 Throughout the 18th century the economic and social chaos fostered by the 
collapse of the traditional timar system and the catastrophic results of the incessant 
wars increased the central government’s inability to enforce authority in the 
provinces. Incompetent and tyrannical officials, lack of security together with the 
acute economic hardships due to huge losses of territory and treasure accelerated the 
erosion of the central authority especially in the Balkans.21 This erosion gave way to 
the advance of brigandage and countless local insurgences that ruined the social and 
                                                 
19 Özkaya, p:46 
20 Özkaya, p:53 
21 Barbara Jelavich, History Of The Balkans Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, New York, 1983, 
p:113 
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economic structure. Then the reign of anarchy led to the emergence of the ayans as 
the de facto rulers of the provinces in time. 
 The Porte had already been relying on the influential individuals and families 
among the local communities as counselors or even mediators to manage the affairs 
between the government and the subjects in the corresponding provinces. Primarily 
ayans used to function as representatives of their local communities using their local 
influence to affect the central governments conduct regarding their community. 
Moreover they were managing the economic affairs like organizing the supply of raw 
materials, determining the market prices, quality of the manufactured goods, and 
taking measures to prevent shortages in collaboration with the kadıs and guilds.22 
They were also responsible for the regulation of public services and maintenance of 
public buildings. Through the mediation of these local notables namely ayans the 
Porte received better compliance to the imperial system from its subjects of diverse 
ethnicities and religions. However the mediator status of the ayans was to change 
drastically towards local administrators and gradually semi-independent rulers in the 
period after the Ottoman-Russian War of 1768-1774 when the timar system 
completely lost its effectiveness in the Balkans.23 In fact the necessity of quick 
supply of cash for the treasury drained by the war expenses and the new military 
organization forced the Porte to conclude the removal of the timar system.24 Besides 
the structural transformation in the world economy from medieval characteristics to 
capitalism also made it inevitable to substitute the timar system with mukataas and 
malikanes.  
                                                 
22 İnalcık, p:44 
23 Sacit Kutlu, Milliyetçilik ve Emperyalizm Yüzyılında Balkanlar ve Osmanlı Devleti, İstanbul 2007, 
p: 39 
24 Erol Özvar, Osmanlı Maliyesinde Malikane Uygulaması, İstanbul 2003, pp:13-16 
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 Malikane system was installed to the Ottoman land regime in order to lessen 
the destructive effects of the short-term tax farming namely iltizam.25 The high 
frequency of subcontracting and over-taxation ruined the tax sources forcing the 
reaya either to flee from their villages or went to bankruptcy by lending money from 
the ribahors to pay the high taxes.26 The reduction in the agricultural production and 
tax revenues together with the increasing budget deficit caused by the war expenses 
forced the central government to extend the application of the malikane system.27 
The contractor or the malikane holder was obliged to pay a specified annual payment 
to the treasury in cash in order to use the tax source for a lifetime. Thus the central 
government could find a more stable and secure cash source than iltizam. Unlike 
timar and iltizam, malikane system was quite close to private property ownership. 
The malikane rights could also be sold, bought and inherited to other individuals 
though on some conditions. In other words the the right to levy taxes was practically 
private property if not the land. The holders of the malikanes were mostly members 
of the askeri class and ulema. 28However just like the arpalık and has lands the 
administration of these malikanes was realized by mütesellims most of whom were 
ayans. Besides the number of ayans holding malikanes grew in steady numbers as 
these ayan-mütesellims maximized their influence and wealth in the provinces 
enjoying the opportunities of mütesellim posts.29 The rapid increase in the number of 
these ayans accelerated the transition from state-owned land regime to semi-private 
land holdings through the malikane system.  But corruption and oppression was also 
frequent in the malikane affairs. Many ayans converted the former timar lands to 
their private farms, çiftliks either by usurpation or bribery and consolidated their 
                                                 
25 EI, V:27, pp:516-517 
26 Özkaya, p:66 
27 Özvar, pp:15-19 
28 Akdağ, p:64 
29 İnalcık, p:33-34 
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wealth by illegal means. The spread of these private farms deprived the peasants 
from their timar lands where they used to enjoy a sort of immunity from the 
oppression of the officials and forced them to serve the Bey or Ayan in his çiftlik 
under unfavorable circumstances. The peasants were even forced to pay additional 
taxes for protection against the bandits. The resented masses of reaya boosted the 
brigandage and insecurity in the provincial regions. In sum iltizam and malikane 
systems installed the ayans into the state structure donating them with great 
opportunities for elevating their status by acquiring land, wealth and political power. 
 While many of the ayans owed their leadership and autonomous sovereignty 
to the religious or tribal prestige in their communities, a significant number of ayans 
ascended to power from banditry. Having no considerable position in the tribal 
hierarchy numerous bandit chiefs managed to transform to vassal princes by literally 
usurping the sovereignty of certain districts and provinces. As mentioned before, 
landless peasants fleeing from the insecurity or oppression, former timar holders, 
mountain dwellers and tribesman formed bandit armies enjoying the absence of 
effective central authority.30 In fact a cyclical condition arose in which the vexed 
masses suffering from insecurity created a complete anarchy by joining the 
brigandage and causing severer destruction in the provinces. As the opposition to the 
settled authority was organized and utilized by some brigand chiefs called derebeyi 
new ayans emerged. But the lucrative opportunities of transformation to autonomous 
princes by banditry generated a stiff competition among them. Though the authority 
of the Porte was reduced to nominal by the autonomy of the ayans it was viewed as 
the leading source of legitimatization of power. The ayans sought the Porte’s official 
acknowledgment regardless of their actual level of power and autonomy. Thus the 
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Porte used their competition and tendency to have their status officially 
acknowledged. It kept the opportunities of acquiring imperial offices, titles and 
honors open for all competing bandits. But it also demonstrated sensitivity in 
preventing the excessive empowerment of a single one among them. The hostilities 
and jealousy between the ayans were promoted by the maneuvers of the Porte. Since 
ayans with more formidable rivals were more eager to remain loyal to the Porte a 
constant and equal level of challenge against them was to be maintained. However 
there were examples of failure in this policy like Mehmed Ali Pasha of Egypt and 
Tepedelenli Ali Pasha who established themselves solidly in their respective regions 
subduing all their rivals.31 On the other hand the Porte’s policy towards the ayans 
was not usually that submissive. It also initiated attempts to eliminate them totally. In 
1786 the ayan institution was dismantled by the firman of the sultan Abdulhamid I.32 
However this challenge ended up with a drastic fall in the tax revenues that forced 
Selim III to restore the institution with additional privileges like the right to rent the 
miri lands to the peasants.33 
 One of the most crucial dilemmas regarding the existence of the ayans and 
the dissolution of the central authority is that some of the ayans proved better 
administrators than the former Ottoman officials. 34 It is possible to assert that the 
situation in certain parts of the empire was indeed better off in terms of agricultural 
production, trade, security and taxation after the tide of anarchy soothed by the 
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34 Better military provisions, rapid increases in the agricultural output, development of trade and small 
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pp:196 
 15 
 
establishment of the potent ayans.35 They provided basic governmental services by 
forming their own government system with jurisdiction, police protection and 
systematized taxation preventing the unjust exactions of the central government.36 
Thus in certain regions of the empire they could gain the support of the local 
inhabitants who suffered more from the tyranny of the former appointed officials. 
Apart from all these the inability of the disorganized timar system to fulfill military 
functions like gathering troops, maintenance of the military facilities and supplying 
provisions were compensated by the local leaders. The regular tax payments and the 
effective military services of the ayans seeking official recognition created an 
indispensable interdependency for both sides. In addition some ayans also gained the 
support of the influential officials or political parties in the capital by bribe and 
consolidated this interdependency. Another dilemma was that the Porte rendered 
some bandits responsible for the security of the provinces and the mountain passes 
where they used to operate. For instance in Greece the martalos or armatoloi 
organization responsible for the security of the mountain passes was mainly staffed 
by the former bandits the klefts.37 It was the traditional Greek militia commissioned 
by the Porte to enforce the sultan’s orders in the inaccessible provinces where 
brigandage was at stake. Just as the iltizam institution these armatoloi were the key 
posts to rise to power as an ayan especially in Greece and Albania. This 
interconnection between the security organization and the bandits was the main 
feature of the ayan phenomenon. Thanks to this opportunity bandits could establish 
themselves as local rulers in proportion to their terror and capability to win the 
                                                 
35 Since many ayans had long- term projections for their sovereignty in a given region they used to 
consider the long-term interests of their lands better than the government officials or timar holders. 
Shaw, pp:213 
36 Jelavich, pp:123-124 
37 Kleft is the Greek word for bandit and it was mainly used for denominating the bandits in Greece 
and Albania.  
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support of the political parties in the capital. Tepedelenli Ali Pasha would also follow 
this way and prove as the keenest among this sort of bandits.   
  Osman Pasbandoglu of Vidin was another crucial example of the ayans who 
followed this way of ascendance to power from banditry. He was born in Vidin in 
1758 as a son of a Bosniac Janissary guard pasband and also a brigand chieftain 
Omer Aga whose brigands’ terror infested the entire territories of Serbia and Little 
Walachia.38 Omer Aga had joined the Ottoman campaign against Austria in 1738 
with its mercenaries and following his services in the war he had been granted a 
couple of villages around Vidin. Soon after Omer Aga was killed by his rivals, 
Osman Pasvandoglu handed over the domains and the leadership of his father’s 
brigand militias. As he became a formidable brigand chief he expanded his area of 
control around Vidin and gradually usurped the control of nearly 200 villages. 39 In 
1788 he entered the service of Walachian Hospodar Mavroyenis with his forces and 
fought against Austria on the Ottoman side.40  But he owed his ultimate rise to power 
to the repercussions of the Nizam-ı Cedid reforms in Rumelia. In 1791 Sultan Selim 
III released a firman that dismembered the Janissary garrison in Belgrade with all of 
its dependencies expelling its troops from service as a penalty for the continuous 
defeats at the Austrian front.41 In fact it was one of the first steps of the Nizam-ı 
Cedid reformation in Rumelia and Selim also attempted to reestablish his authority in 
the region after the Zcsytovy Treaty. Then the reaction of the dismissed Janissaries 
would have greater affects than expected. After their vain attempts of intrigue with 
the Austrian authorities for their intervention to their dispute 8 to 10 thousand men 
some of whom allied with the local mountaineer bandits the kırcalıs initiated an 
                                                 
38 Archives De France R.F, Affaires Etrangeres, C.P Turquie 216/1808 p:306 
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40 A.D.F, p:307 
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extensive brigand terror in the region.42 Consequently Pasbandoglu managed to 
organize most of these rebel janissaries under his command and formed a large 
mercenary army.  He captured the city of Vidin with ease by the year 1794 receiving 
the support of the locals. Relying on this formidable force he secured his domains 
from the brigand mountaineers and secured the passage of the caravans.43  Making 
great use the vexations of the reaya resulting from the permanent insecurity and 
additional taxes for the Nizam- i Cedid troops Pasbandoglu pretended to be a 
benevolent ruler. He imposed the lowest level of poll tax when compared to his 
neighbor beys.44 He also abolished all sorts of emergency taxes and additional levies 
for the Irad-i Cedid, the new treasury for the Nizam-i Cedid reforms.45 However the 
Porte did not recognize his usurpation and launched serial campaigns against him 
between 1795 and 1798. But all imperial campaigns were doomed to failure. His 
subsequent victories against the imperial forces spread his fame throughout the 
Balkans increasing the adhesion of the reaya to him and also adding new resented 
Janissary brigands to his retinue. His military capabilities were also boosted by the 
capture of weaponry from the imperial armies in serious quantities. Pasbandoglu 
even intimidated his ex-sovereign the Hospodar or vassal king of Walachia and 
forced him not to contribute to the Ottoman campaigns against Vidin by besieging 
his palace.46 Then the last great campaign against Pasbandoglu was undertaken in 
1798. The new Nizam-i Cedid troops supported by the mercenaries of several ayans 
including Tepedelenli Ali Pasha besieged Vidin. But it resulted to a severe defeat of 
the imperial forces. Then the Porte admitted Pasbandoglu’s seizure of power and 
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appointed him as the pasha of Vidin by 1799.47 Having offered his so-called loyalty 
to the Sultan Pasbandoglu received the title of vizier with three tails.  
 The backgrounds and the ways of ascending to power in the cases of 
Pasbandoglu and Tepedelenli have some identical features. Both rose to power from 
banditry usurping the old timar lands and converting them to their own private 
çiftliks. Both relied on the local brigands namely kırcalıs in Bulgaria and klefts in 
Greece at the same time fought against them at the service of the Porte. The outbreak 
of two major revolts namely the Serbian in 1804 and the Greek in 1820 gave them 
almost the same role or capability which was to fill the gap of the Porte’s eroded 
authority and either to check the power of the nationalist movements or to use them. 
Accordingly none of them overtly opposed to the revolutionaries on the contrary they 
established links with them as a leverage against the Porte. The major distinction 
between the histories of these two ayans lies in the course of their career. 
Pasbandoglu rose to power after a revolt that lasted 10 years then attached to the 
imperial system receiving the pardon of the sultan. He remained as a renegade during 
most of his career and he could not be removed from the historical scene until his 
natural death in 1807. But Tepedelenli had never been such a manifest foe of the 
Porte until the last two years of his life. After series of achievements in local banditry 
he entered the Port’s service and made most of his riches as well as political power 
during his imperial service. On the other hand Pasbandoglu’s power was not only 
derived from banditry. He relied on the Janissaries and the local people that 
constituted a stiff opposition to the Nizam-i Cedid reforms. They gave him a solid 
military and political power to back his autonomous existence. The Porte’s inability 
to eliminate Pasbandoglu was most probably due to this conglomeration of many 
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fragments of opposition on his side. As far as Tepedelenli is concerned such a 
massive opposition or power base was nonexistent in Albania and Greece. The most 
organized circle of opposition was the Greek revolutionaries who never viewed the 
pasha as an ally. Therefore Tepedelenli sought an additional pillar for his existence 
in close contacts with the great powers. His rapid fall after the cease of these 
relations with Britain and France give some hints about how affective were these 
relations for the continuity of the pasha’s existence. 
 
2.2 THE GREEK INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT ON THE EVE OF THE 
REVOLT 
  The 18th century can be considered as the age of a Greek revival by which 
the Greek elements in the Ottoman Empire experienced a series of economic, 
political and cultural transformation. The existing merchant networks of the Ottoman 
Greeks found lucrative opportunities to expand thanks to the developments in 
international politics. 48 The decline of Venice and the disrupted operations of the 
western merchants in the Ottoman Ports due to continuous wars enabled the Greeks 
to increase their share in the transportation of Balkan raw materials to Europe.49 
They also imported manufactured goods of the west to the empire establishing new 
trade communities in the European ports and capitals. On the other hand the treaties 
of Kuchuk Kainarja 1774 and Jassy 1792 had opened the Black Sea and Straits to 
Russian and Austrian commerce. As the Ottoman Greeks were allowed to operate 
carrying the Russian flag they gained immunity from the imperial regulations and 
restrictions. Moreover the vast open market of the Southern Russia together with the 
highly profitable grain trade between the Ottoman Empire and Russia entailed 
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additional means of enrichment for the Greek merchant. Just as in the Mediterranean, 
Black Sea ports were infested with the Greek merchant communities. The destruction 
of the French and British commercial fleets in the Mediterranean by the Napoleonic 
Wars almost monopolized the Greeks in the Mediterranean trade. The successes in 
the marine trade influenced the Greek handicraft industries too. The petty Greek 
craftsmen started to export their goods to European countries in greater quantities. 
The growth of Greek economic power also led to the growth of their influence on 
domestic politics. Thus Selim III granted the Greek community the right to form 
their own guild and all the privileges given to the European merchants.50 The 
influence of the Greeks in the banking and finance activities expanded following this 
political gain. As a result the boosted Greek capital was channeled to usury and 
foreign funds in the European banks.51 Besides, a serious amount of Greek capital 
was invested in the legitimate banking system of the empire. Thus the Jewish and 
Armenian monopoly in the Ottoman credit market was challenged by the advent of 
an increasing number of Greek bankers.52 
 The most remarkable outcome of these economic developments was the rise 
of a new Greek middle class spread throughout Europe. The Greeks in the Ottoman 
Empire acquired means of interaction with the west since they retained their ties with 
the Greek merchant Diaspora. 53The interaction and familiarity with the western 
world would soon reveal the contrasts between the conditions of the Ottoman Greeks 
and the Diaspora in Europe. Thus the ideal of liberation and ending the Ottoman rule 
would find the most suitable ground to blossom among this middle class. It was not a 
coincidence that the Greek Revolutionary Society Philiki Hetairia was founded by 
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these merchants. However the decisive stimulation was to come from the French 
Revolution that would unite the large fragments of the Greek peasant world with the 
revolutionary circles from the middle class. The advent of the revolutionary ideas 
would soon generate a cadre of Greek revolutionary intelligentsia that would prepare 
the ideological framework to be followed. Adamantis Korais and Rhigas Pheraios 
were two of the most eminent figures among this cadre. Korais published the Greek 
classics in simple vernacular with lengthy introductions loaded with revolutionary 
messages.54 In addition to the propaganda it served his linguistic reform attempts. He 
aimed to eliminate the widespread illiteracy among the peasants and to facilitate the 
access to the Greek cultural heritage to be able to form some degree of national 
identity.55 Unlike Korais, Pheriaos was both an activist revolutionary and a man of 
thought. After years of service to Alexander Ipsilanti the dragoman of the Porte at 
that time, and Walachian Hospodar Mavroyenis he fled to Vienna where he pursued 
his literal activities.56 He established his own secret revolutionary organization 
Hetairia, wrote newspaper articles to arouse a Greek patriotic zeal by using French 
revolutionary ideas.57 In 1797 he released his revolutionary manifesto and had it 
published in 3000 copies to be distributed among the Greeks. 58It included a 
proclamation, a declaration of the rights of man, the constitution of the New Greek 
state to be established after the revolution and a martial hymn calling the Balkan 
Christians to fight against the Ottomans.59 But the efforts of Pheraios would not be 
long-lived since he was arrested by the Austrians just after the release of the 
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manifesto and extradited to the Ottoman Empire where he would be executed. 
Pheraios had envisaged a democratic Hellenic state inspired by the imperial heritage 
of the Byzantine ages with diverse religions and ethnicities unified by the adoption of 
a common Greek culture and values. Since his counsels and projects were not 
followed totally, he well propagated the idea of an independent Greek state to the 
masses and became a heroic vanguard figure. Meanwhile the intellectual revival was 
coupled with a rapid schooling throughout Europe and the Ottoman Empire. Greek 
schools, most of which were opened by the donations of the wealthy merchants 
created generations with European values and revolutionary ideas.60 A serious 
number of the graduated Greek students were sent to European universities and their 
continuous contact with Europe expanded the newly rising Greek revolutionary 
intelligentsia’s range of action.61 In addition to the search for Russian patronage and 
protection, the Greek revolutionaries also sought European support though to a lesser 
degree. Thus the economic revival now transformed to an educational one paving the 
way for the ultimate revival the Independence.  
 Among the various revolutionary organizations founded by the Greek 
merchant Diaspora following Pheraios’s example, Philiki Hetairia proved the most 
effective. Three Greek merchants Athanasius Tsakalov, Nikolaos Skoufas and 
Emmanuil Xanthos founded it in Odessa in 1814.62 Xanthos was a member of the 
Masonic lodge of the Ionian Islands and the other two were already members of 
different revolutionary organizations.63 They followed the model of the freemason 
hierarchy in which operations of propaganda and recruitment of volunteers were 
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carried out by separate cells. Thus they achieved a swift but secure growth in the 
organization. After the death of Skoufas, Alexander Ipsilanti took over the 
leadership. This would be a milestone in the history of the Greek Independence 
movement. The radicals in the organization astutely exploited the Russian connection 
of Ipsilanti and by their overwhelming propaganda they convinced the masses about 
the illusionary Russian support for the outbreak of the revolt.64 Though unjustified it 
sufficed to overcome the vacillations of the primates in the Morea to start the revolt. 
 In such a conjuncture Tepedelenli Ali Pasha stepped in to the historical scene. 
He benefited from the opportunities of the chaotic atmosphere in the Balkans where 
the central authority ceased to be effective. He ascended to power as a brigand chief 
and then legitimized himself within the imperial system by being a part of the ayan 
institution. Then his violence, oppression and political intrigues together with the 
availability of the international conjuncture gained him the position of the most 
powerful ayan in the Balkans. This position enabled him to take part in foreign 
entanglements that would soon put him in the middle of the Greek Independence 
question. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
64 In fact the Russian policy to back the revolutionary movements in the Balkans was not illusionary. 
The Hetairists also had contacts with the Russians starting from their leader who was an admiral in the 
Russian navy but at that time no concrete offer of support was valid for an immediate action to start 
the revolt. 
 24 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
 
THE EASTERN QUESTION AND THE GREAT POWERS  
1774-1815 
 
 
 The Eastern Question can be denominated simply as the conglomeration of 
political problems posed by the struggle among the Great Powers to fill up the 
vacuum of the Ottoman Empire’s gradual decay starting from the late 17th century 
according to some historians. The major conflicts rallied around the political and 
economic domination on the Levant, the seizure of the Straits and the future of the 
Balkans. This struggle gained momentum after the subsequent defeats of the 
Ottomans against the Russians in the 18th century. However it would dominate the 
European agenda only after the Napoleonic wars. In fact the period between 1774 
and 1815 could be labeled as the preliminary phase of the Eastern Question which 
had a tertiary significance in the international politics of that time. 
 As the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji or Küçük Kaynarca rendered Russia a 
Black Sea power and the protector of the Slavic peoples under Ottoman rule, Russia 
found suitable grounds for its designs on the Straits, Balkans and the Mediterranean. 
Besides it started to get a greater share from the Mediterranean and Black Sea trade 
acquiring commercial privileges from the Sultan. The annexation of Crimea in 1783 
 25 
 
which was followed by further annexations in the Caucasus consolidated Russian 
influence in and pressure on the Ottoman territories. 
 The Porte had a manifest reluctance for applying the terms of the Kutchuk 
Kainardji Treaty and France was in favor of this procrastination policy.65 Until 
Napoleon’s elevation to power France used to view the Ottoman Empire as a 
protectorate to be sustained, just like Poland and Sweden. These three periphery 
powers were utilized to check the Habsburg and Russian expansion. Accordingly the 
continuous Russian victories against them that ended with the partition of Poland, 
and the Russian acquisition of secure access to Baltic and Black Seas deepened the 
French antagonism towards the Russians. Among these traditional allies or 
protectorates the Ottoman Empire had a privileged position since it was a far larger 
market and a great source of raw materials for the French industries. 66In addition the 
French foreign policy regarding the Eastern question was influenced by the scenario 
of a possible Russian occupation of the Ottoman capital. Hence the French perceived 
the Russian advance in the Balkans and the Caucasus as a severe threat which made 
it the single European power that was eager to support the Ottomans against the 
menace of the Russians. But the exhausting colonial wars between France and 
Britain impeded a proper French support the Ottomans in the annexation of Crimean 
peninsula and the Ottoman Caucasian territories. French attempts to establish 
effective alliances against the Russians also failed since Austria was far from daring 
to confront Russia while under the threat of the Prussian aggression.67 Another fact 
that hindered the intervention of the French was that suspicion among the French 
authorities concerning the necessity of continuing pro-Ottoman policies created a 
                                                 
65 Matthew Smith Anderson, Doğu Sorunu, İstanbul, 2001, p:21 
66 J.A.R.Marriott, The Eastren Question  An Hıstorical Study in European Diplomacy, Oxford, 1969, 
p:145-146 
67 Paul W.Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848, Oxford,1994, p:181 
 26 
 
sort of hesitation to take a more activist position. The future French ambassador to 
İstanbul Saint Priest had suggested that the empire was doomed to collapse and 
France should have taken its own share by occupying Egypt in the early 1770’s.68 
Though not supported by the French authorities and installed to the French Foreign 
policy immediately, his views would finally gain priority during Napoleonic era. 
Finally Crimean crisis proved to the Ottomans that the French alliance was unlikely 
to go beyond nominal. By the 1780’s France maintained this nominal support by the 
dispatch of some military specialists and technicians for modernization of the 
Ottoman army. But it would not suffice to maintain its political influence on the 
Ottomans. The Porte would persistently reject opening Black Sea to the French 
merchant fleets. 
 The rapid Russian advance in the Caucasus, intrigues of the Russian consuls 
in Zscasy and Bucharest together with the Russian opposition to the aperture of 
Ottoman consulates in Russian territories were straining the barely established peace 
between Russia and the Ottoman Empire. In fact Ottoman calculations to get back 
the Muslim populated territories like Crimea and the Caucasus was behind the policy 
of escalating the tension. Finally the Walachian Hospodar, Alexander 
Mavrocordato’s flight to Russia triggered the outbreak of a blatant conflict.69 Then 
the Porte declared a series of demands to the Russian ambassador in 1787 among 
which the cession of Crimea to the Ottomans was present. The denial of the Ottoman 
demands would mark the beginning of another Ottoman-Russian war. This time 
Austria would ally with Russia and wage war on the Porte in 1788. However 
Austrian designs for territorial expansion in the Balkans would be overshadowed by 
its fear from a Prussian attack on Bohemia. Under the Prussian political pressure 
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Joseph II of Austria could barely maintain the alliance with Russia for two years. 
When Russian position deteriorated as Sweden launched a surprise offensive from 
the north and won victories in the Baltic Sea against Russia, Austria concluded the 
Sistovo peace with the Ottomans in 1791 retaining Galicia but handing Serbia back 
to the Porte.70 
 Intensely occupied with the colonial affairs British governments remained 
distant to the Eastern question until the end of the 1780’s. They showed little or no 
interest towards the Russian expansion. However the refusal of Catherine to renew 
the Anglo-Russian commercial treaty, betterment of Russo-French relations via trade 
agreements and the British tendency to provide cheaper wood products from Poland 
started a slow detachment from the Russian alliance in commercial matters. But a 
political split was also on the way. By 1788 the new government under Primer 
Minister William Pitt would intent to alter the British position from indifference to 
activism against Russia.71 Now Britain would conduct a containment policy to check 
the rapid advance of the Russians by establishing close relations with Prussia and the 
Ottoman Empire. Pitt sought to establish a federative system to safeguard the smaller 
powers of Europe against Russian expansion. Far from reaching the goal of a 
continental alliance including numerous powers his attempts ended with the 
conclusion of the Triple alliance between Britain, Prussia and the United Provinces. 
The alliance was to restore the balance of power in Europe which was changed by 
the partition of Poland and the Ottoman defeats. Besides Britain was concerned with 
saving Belgium from France and Prussia was in pursuit of Danzig while pressuring 
Denmark. British plans to curb a possible Russo-French trade monopoly in the Black 
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Sea also required a firm policy against Russia.72 Under these circumstances the 
Russian occupation of Ochakov a strategic fort on the conjunction of the rivers Bug 
and Dinyester that controlled the trade route reaching Poland generated crisis 
between the alliance and Russia. 73 However the reluctance of the Prussians and the 
lack of public support in Britain would inhibit Pitt’s attempts to intimidate Russia 
and in the short run forcing it to cede Ochakov back to the Porte. In the end Britain 
could only suggest the Porte to make peace with Russia at any cost. Although Britain 
failed to bring Russia to the peace table with the Ottomans on the basis of status quo 
ante the Prussian land force combined with the British sea power had saved Holland 
from France, Sweden from Denmark, and Belgium from French- inspired Revolution 
and Poland from Russian domination. The significance of this failure of the 
continental alliance project in the Eastern affairs was that Britain no longer sought to 
confront Russia for the next 25 years leaving the Ottoman Empire vulnerable to 
Russian and Austrian aggression.74  
 By the Treaty of Jassy in 1792 the conclusion of peace between Russia and 
Turkey opened the way for the struggle between the German powers and the 
revolutionary French. The emergence of the first coalition namely the Austro-
Prussian alliance against France which would be joined by others carried the 
epicenter of power struggle from the east to the west for a short period until 1797. 
Then by the advent of the second coalition led by Britain the antagonisms and 
clashes connected with the Eastern question would be refreshed. The French 
expansion would exceed the borders of Europe reaching up to Eastern Mediterranean 
and Egypt by the expedition of Napoleon Bonaparte in 1798. France was no longer 
eager to sustain the integrity of the decaying Ottoman Empire on the contrary it was 
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determined to get its share from its possessions. This would drastically change its 
position in the Eastern Question. Since the attack upon Egypt was also directed 
against British interests Britain would hand over the role of sustaining the Ottomans. 
Apart from curbing the British access to its Indian colonies France also had designs 
of reviving the ancient trade route between the East and West passing through the 
Red Sea reaching Mediterranean via Egypt.75 Hence French projects regarding Egypt 
and the British counter measures to confront the French maximized the significance 
of the Mediterranean. The conquest of Italy, Malta and the annexation of the Ionian 
Islands enabled France to deal with the Egyptian affairs more solidly since it became 
a real Mediterranean power having control on the most strategic spots in the 
Mediterranean. Having established itself in Italy and the Ionian Islands France had 
the necessity to enter into direct contact with the local powers in order to be able to 
secure its feeble existence challenged by the British and the Russians. The latter two 
also took their counter measures and conducted their own strategies regarding the 
Mediterranean by establishing ties with the local powers by propagating revolutions, 
fostering instability and backing the autonomous local rulers. In sum the 
Mediterranean including the Southern Balkans became an extended part if not the 
epicenter of the power struggle between the great powers in which local autonomous 
powers assumed greater significance than ever engaging in foreign entanglements.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
BACKGROUND OF ALI PASHA 
 
 
4.1 EARLY DAYS OF BRIGANDAGE AND TRIBAL WARFARE 
 
 Tepedelenli Ali Pasha was born in Tepedelen a small town on the left bank of 
the river Vjosa or Aous around 1750 as a scion of the Toskide Albanian nobility 
which were Muslims by majority.76 His great grandfather Mustafa or Moutzo 
Housso, was a famous kleft chieftain who ascended to the official title of kapıcıbaşı 
and then mutesellim in the nahiye of Tepedelen. His mother Ismihan or Hamko also 
descended from a Toskide Albanian aristocratic family whose father was Zeynel Bey 
of Konitza.  Mustafa’s son Muhtar was a brigand leader of reputation too who 
perished in the war against the Venetian Republic at Corfu in 1717 and distinguished 
as şehid or martyr.77 After a series of family quarrels and tribal conflicts following 
the death of Muhtar, his nephew Islam Bey took over the leadership of the brigand 
                                                 
76 The ethnic origin of Ali Pasha is a quite controversial issue. Though it is almost clear that his 
mother was a Toskide Albanian his paternal descendance is vague. Unfortunately no source can 
exceed the limits of mere hearsays on this point. Among the very limited literature consisting of 
biographical works, historical narratives and travel accounts it is possible to view that the sources 
portraying his antecedents as Albanians outnumber the ones refering to his Turkish descent. Though 
both sides lack proper evidence rather than relying on some unspecified sources of a vague oral 
historiography it seems convenient to refer to the most popular explanations. Several western primary 
sources most of which are memoirs of the European travellers, commanders, diplomats  who had been 
to Greece, Albania and even the court of the pasha are in a consensus about his Albanian origin. In 
addition their basic claim is that they got this information personally from the pasha who is said to 
have an exclusive interest for exposing his past.  
77 T.S Hughes, Travels in Greece and Albania, London 1830, vol:2,p-p:109 
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groups and also the control of the Toskide country. Then the Porte titled him as 
mutasarrıf of the Sancak of Delvino with the title of Mir-i miran. But soon after Ali 
Pasha’s father Veli killed his cousin Islam bey together with some other members of 
his family, the Porte officially recognized his seizure of power by promoting him to 
the latter’s post namely mutasarrıf of Delvino.78 Under the feudal tenure 
acknowledged by the Porte, Veli took possession of several çiftliks in the region but 
his reign was destined to end soon since the alliance of his resented rivals was strong 
enough to convince the Porte for his quick dismissal. After his dismissal and the 
appointment of Selim Bey to Delvino, the beys of Kaminitza, Klissura, Premeti and 
Argyrocastro waged war on Veli to eliminate him. Too weak to resist the allied beys 
Veli lost many of his territories and died by the year 1760. The desperate widow 
Hamko with her two little children had to face a severe struggle to retain the 
remainders of her husband’s lands and treasure. The allied Beys taking advantage of 
the feeble situation of Hamko attacked the family’s territories without delay. Since 
the youngster Ali was too inexperienced to head the war against the aggression of 
these Beys, Hamko gathered the most loyal vassals of her husband, organized them 
under her command, resisted the attacks of the confederacy of the hostile Beys and 
initiated counter brigand incursions into their territories. Unexpectedly she proved 
quite talented as a tribal brigand leader defending her territories and making serious 
amounts of booty by destroying the villages of the enemy tribes. Ali also received a 
complete military education from his mother during these tribal wars and started to 
lead small brigand groups himself. Besides, his character was shaped by the fierce 
circumstances of this constant warfare in addition to Hamko’s ardent manner and 
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implacable ambitions.79 Hamko installed revenge, undaunted temerity, 
mercilessness, greed for wealth and power to the young brigand’s soul, which would 
help him to ascend to power. 
 The victorious resistance of Hamko against the confederacy of the 
neighboring tribes aroused an additional indignation among them since a woman 
chieftain foiled them. The inhabitants of Gardiki a town near Argyrocastro who 
suffered most from the attacks of Hamko’s bands, sent a select band to Tepedelen 
that infiltrated into Ali’s house and managed to kidnap Hamko with her daughter 
Şehnisa while Ali was away.80 The dreadful abuses inflicted on his mother and sister 
as well as the loss of the head of the family’s brigand bands led Ali to take over and 
collect forces with haste. But just before his attempt to rescue his family, one of the 
notable Gardikiots Demir Dost Bey anguished by the miserable conditions of Hamko 
and Şehnisa, helped them to flee from Gardiki.81 He safely brought them back to 
Tepedelen where Ali was still preparing for an attack. Soon after this incident Ali 
became much more desirous of leading the brigand forces and attacking the foes of 
his family. The shame of having failed to rescue his mother and sister from the 
Gardikiots as well as his mother’s unending humiliating reproaches flared his 
ambition for revenge and victory.82 But this time Ali and his family were no longer 
wealthy enough to maintain the necessary number of troops to struggle against 
enemy tribes. Having fled from Tepedelen before the expected attack of the 
                                                 
79 The biographies of Ali Pasha reflected by the primary sources of the western travellers unanimously 
portrait Hamko as a fiercely ambitious and merciless character. The sanguine stories of her struggle 
with the menacing relatives consolidate this image. Besides all emphasize that the character of Ali was 
shaped by her revengeful manner.  
Hughes, pp:109-110, Poqueville, pp:270-271 
80 Hughes, p:113 
81 Gabriel Remerand reflects the story a bit different. According to him no abuse could have been 
inflicted on the captives since Şehnisa would marry the son of Kaplan pasha soon after her release. 
Considering the Albanian traditions the tribal communities would never admit such a marriage 
provided that she and her mother were treated in a dishonoring manner.Ahmet Mufid also asserts that 
the two captives were released after their ransom was paid by a Greek merchant. 
82 Hughes, p:114 
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Gardikiots, the family started roaming the mountains with a small number of troops 
hoping to collect as much treasure as possible to strengthen their forces and retake 
their possessions. Meanwhile Ali’s fortuitous discovery of a buried pot full of 
Venetian sequins enabled him to collect more troops and continue brigand activities 
in the mountains for some time. 83 
Under the illusion of this sudden relief and recovery in terms of wealth and power, 
Ali marched against the tribal confederacy of the Beys of Gardiki, Argyrocastro, 
Goritza, Hormovo and Kaminitza who had usurped his father Veli’s territories and 
drove them away from Tepedelen.84 In the battlefield his forces were about to be 
annihilated by the confederates but he could break the alliance of the enemy tribes 
astutely after a secret visit to their camp by which he could convince the chiefs of 
Gardiki and Argyrocastro, barely loyal to the alliance, to withdraw their forces and 
turn against the rest of the Beys. Having secured peace with these two neighboring 
tribes Ali ravaged the mountain districts in Epirus with his extended number of 
klefts. Thanks to his achievements in brigandage he could confine his mother to the 
harem taking the management of affairs into his own hands. He gradually established 
an absolute reign in his hometown Tepedelen owing much to his cunning 
conspiracies and ruthless violence, which gave him an exclusive reputation as a 
sanguinary brigand chief. The increased amount of treasures and the spread of his 
kleftic terror aligned other Toskid families with him augmenting his authority in 
Epirus. In addition to Ali’s forces there were also independent kleft groups which 
were in a sort of agreement with him. He allowed them to operate in certain regions 
close to Tepedelen on the condition of paying a certain amount of tribute and 
yielding a portion from the booty. 
                                                 
83 This story takes part in all travel accounts narrating the history of the pasha. For the most detailed: 
Hughes, p:115, Davenport, p:12 
84 Hughes, p:116 
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 As Ali expanded his area of control and emerged as a remarkable bandit 
chieftain, the authority of Kurt Ahmet Pasha of Berat the most influential Bey of 
Albania of that time who was also titled as Derbentler Başbuğu or superintendent of 
all roads and mountain passes was also challenged to a great extent. 85Kurt Pasha had 
arrested him with his militia and imprisoned him for some time in the first years of 
his brigand career during his wars against the tribal confederacy. But now having 
increased the number of his troops and acquired considerable riches from pillage, Ali 
was far from being an easy prey for him. Apart from pillaging and ransoming the 
travelers passing from the mountains his brigands also started to spread their terror in 
the plains attacking villages and small towns. Ultimately he exacted huge amounts of 
ransom from the chiefs of the towns Zagori and Paleo Pogoghiani, threatening them 
with destruction if they failed to pay the taxes or haraç and resist him by taking Kurt 
Pasha’s side. 86After receiving the letters of these two town’s chiefs full of 
complaints and demands for help together with the imperial orders released from the 
Porte ordering Ali’s elimination, Kurt Pasha organized a conspiracy by which he 
aimed to assassinate him.87 He sent envoys to Tepedelen and invited Ali to his palace 
proposing a post in his court namely kahyalık and promised help to secure an official 
pardon from the sultan. Having complied with the counsels of his servants bribed by 
Kurt Pasha and his mother Hamko, Ali proceeded to Berat. But at last Kurt Pasha 
preferred to negotiate the terms of an alliance with Ali rather than to assassinate him. 
Thus Ali, seeking each and every means to strengthen his position consented to enter 
into Kurt Pasha’s service with his militia. He fought against the rebel pasha Mehmet 
Bushatli of Scutari who revolted when the Porte deprived him of his rights of 
exploitation of the lands between Avlona and Alessio belonging to the sultan’s sister 
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by appointing Kurt Pasha as his successor. Ali’s achievements in the battlefield that 
proved his reputation as a valiant warrior were enough to give him the courage to 
make a daring request to Kurt Pasha.88 Confident about his value on behalf of the 
Pasha, Ali unveiled his intention to be his son-in-law.89 Thus Kurt Pasha would make 
use of him in his struggle against the rival Beys in return for tolerating his brigand 
activities to a certain extent. But the consequences would be quite disappointing for 
Ali. Kurt Pasha refused him and even chose Ibrahim Pasha of Avlona as his son-in-
law who possessed a far higher rank in the Albanian tribal aristocracy with greater 
domains. This matrimony marked the beginning of a long-lasting discord and rivalry 
between Ibrahim and Ali. But Kurt pasha would be dismissed soon by the intrigues 
of his rivals who had anticipated the possible aftermath of his alliance with Ibrahim. 
As this marriage was concluded in 1764 Ali fled from Berat returning to the 
mountains for banditry. This time he was operating in the surroundings of Ioannina 
pillaging the villages and robbing the passengers on the way. But he would not save 
his klefts from being dispersed by the allied villagers under the leadership of the 
Hormovites. Having failed to establish himself either in the city or in the mountains 
Ali took refuge at the court of Kaplan Pasha the manifest foe of Kurt Pasha. Once 
again he sought to establish family ties with the Albanian tribal aristocracy. In 1768 
he married Kaplan Pasha’s daughter Ummugulsum and accomplished his desire to be 
a part of a potent and wealthy family.90 Muhtar and Veli who would play a 
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significant role in his pashalık as the governors of Morea and Prevesa were the 
offspring of this marriage. 91 
 During his residence at the court of Kaplan Pasha Ali never ceased to arrange 
conspiracies to supplant his suzerain. In pursuit of an imperial post namely the 
mutasarrıflık or deputy governorship of Delvino Ali constantly suggested to Kaplan 
Pasha to abstain from crushing the Himariot Clefts of Acarnania whose bandit 
activities had incited the Porte’s rage. Kaplan Pasha was ordered to eliminate the 
Himariots but he reacted to the imperial orders with reluctance since he had designs 
to keep on good terms with those klefts. Discouraged by his own priorities and also 
Ali’s counsels Kaplan Pasha delayed the urged operation and estranged his relations 
with the Porte. On the other hand Ali was engaged in a secret correspondence with 
the governor of Rumelia informing him of Kaplan Pasha’s friendly relations with the 
Himariots and inclination to revolt in tandem with the Klefts. The perfidy of Ali was 
to serve the Porte’s plans to eliminate Kaplan Pasha. Then in 1768 the governor of 
Rumelia summoned Kaplan Pasha to testify in his court the affairs of Hurmovo and 
Ali assured of his father-in-law’s fate, employed all his talents to persuade him to go. 
Finally Kaplan Pasha arrived in Manastır where he would be executed by the 
governor. The quick elimination of Kaplan Pasha maximized Ali’s expectations to be 
rewarded by the Porte with the pashalık of Delvino and a portion from his treasure. 
But Kaplan Pasha’s treasures were confiscated by the Porte and his son Ali Bey of 
Argyrocastro was appointed as his successor.92 
 The failure of his intrigues for elevation to a pashalık drove him to resort to 
establishing additional family ties with the Albanian notables. As a result he 
managed to arrange a marriage between his sister Şehnisa and the new pasha of 
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Delvino Ali in 1769. 93This political marriage would end when Ali Pasha of Delvino 
was killed in a suspicious bloody family quarrel in 1773.94 Now the opportunity of 
elevation to the pashalık of Delvino was refreshed for Ali. But the widespread 
suspicion about his connection with the murder rooted by his inaction to seek 
revenge from the murderers of his brother-in-law aroused fierce indignation among 
the tribal communities and inhibited his designs. Then the Porte appointed Mustafa 
Kokka to the pashalık but interestingly he had the same fate as Ali Pasha of 
Argyrocastro. In consequence Selim Bey one of the wealthiest beys of Delvino 
ascended to the pashalık to whom Ali Pasha pretended to be loyal and maintained his 
amicable relations for some time. But Ali would turn against Selim too when he fell 
into disfavor before the Porte.  
 The Venetian Proveditori or governors in the Ionian Islands used to pursue a 
traditional policy of refraining from generating any discord with the semi-
independent Albanian Beys owning domains in the littoral Albania. More than that, 
they used to give the highest priority to the forming of solid alliances with these beys 
for mere logistical purposes for the most part obtaining wood and grain. Selim Pasha 
having taken advantage of this policy consolidated his relations and acquired a strong 
cooperation with the Venetian authorities on the islands. These close relations even 
reached to selling land to the Venetian republic. In fact Selim had sold a tiny strip of 
grove along the coast of his domains at the vicinity of Butrinto to the Venetians.95 
Nevertheless the territories under Selim Pasha’s control just as all territories within 
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the dominions of the ayans and vassal beys legally belonged to the sultan. Thus 
selling of the sultan’s property even to non-Muslims was a felony and it would be 
penalized with the harshest sanction when it was unveiled. Informed of the sale by 
his agents Ali enjoyed this fortunate opportunity to demonstrate his loyalty to the 
Porte and to gain credit for his promotion to an imperial office he had been craving 
for so long. Then Ali’s agents sent several reports tracing the deeds of Selim and 
after presenting the evidences of infidelity to the Porte Ali volunteered to lead any 
possible operation against him. 96In the meantime the antagonists of Selim in 
Delvino who were already eager to join in any intrigue against him were organized 
by Ali and sent letters of denunciation to the Porte supporting his claims. Finally the 
firman ordering Selim Pasha’s removal would arrive to Ali rendering him 
responsible for the operation, which meant the expected reward was on the way for 
him.  
 
4.2 ALI PASHA AT THE PORTE’S SERVICE 
 The Porte’s policy towards the menacing local notables was simply based on 
fostering conflicts among the most powerful ones and preventing absolute 
domination of a single bey that could eradicate nominal Ottoman sovereignty in the 
corresponding region. The official titles and honors granted by the Sultan were 
utilized as leverage to check and maintain the power balance among the ayans. The 
competition among the ayans boosted by greed and jealousy was always promoted 
by the delivery of these imperial titles and honors. In addition the elimination of the 
most disfavored ayans was undertaken via other ayans who were considered 
relatively more manageable and less perilous by the Porte. Actually this cyclical 
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competition for being the instruments of the Porte’s vengeance saved the empire 
from excessive decentralization and total dismemberment. Ali made great use of this 
policy of the Porte in his career and benefited from the changes in its attitudes 
towards the local Beys.97  
 By the dismissal of Kurt Pasha from the pashalık of Berat and also from the 
Derbends in 1778 Ali had paid all his attention to acquire his binary post. 
Consequently he hired his services to the Pasha of Negroponte for a short time and 
achieved a considerable wealth by which he managed to aggrandize his militia.98 At 
length having detached from all suzerains, Ali undertook serial massacres and booty 
again in all parts of Epirus and subdued Kaminitza, Libokovo, Malisovo, Hormovo, 
Lekli and Giates.99 His brigandage infested throughout the pashalık of Berat 
destroying many towns and villages inhabited by the reaya of Kurt Pasha. 
Nevertheless he gradually installed his own authority in some parts of the pashalıks 
of Ioannina and Berat. In his first major attempt to gain the Porte’s favor he 
volunteered to march against Selim Pasha of Delvino who as mentioned before had 
ceded or literally sold a strip of grove near the town of Butrinto to the Venetians. 
Complying with order of the Porte to reduce Selim, he penetrated his court, gained 
his confidence by his services, and finally murdered him with the help of the latter’s 
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antagonists.100 In fact Ali was expecting to be granted the pashalık of Ioannina or 
Delvino as he eliminated a perfidious ayan. But the reward of this treachery was only 
the post of kahya or lieutenant to the newly appointed Çatalcalı Hacı Ali Pasha who 
also got the title of Derbentler Başbuğu after the dismissal of Kurt Pasha. 101Though 
it was much less than what Ali expected, this post laid the foundations of Ali’s future 
sovereignty in Greece and Albania. More than that, he would achieve the expected 
reward thanks to this humble post. Since Hacı Ali Pasha retired to his seraglio 
leaving the entire responsibilities of his very title as Derbentler Başbuğu to his 
kahya, Ali found the opportunity to establish his authority, spreading his terror, 
suppressing the armatols, klepths and many of his rivals via his official duty of 
maintaining the security of the roads and mountain passes. Due to his achievements 
in suppressing the klefts and armatols, he was granted the pashalık of Triccala and 
Thessaly with two tails in 1783.102 This very first acquisition in terms of official 
authority enabled him to deal with the affairs of Thessaly and Epirus more solidly. 
Soon after receiving the berat appointing him as Pasha he chose to reconcile with 
Ibrahim, the successor of Kurt pasha, by marrying his two sons Muhtar and Veli to 
Ibrahim’s daughters.103 Once again establishing family ties concluded the peace and 
provided him a suitable and secure atmosphere, though temporary, to crush the 
relatively weaker Beys. 
  1787 was also the year of the commencement of a war between the Porte and 
the allied powers of Austria-Hungary and Russia that would last until 1792 by which 
Ali found a suitable ground to progress his career at the Porte’s service. Thanks to 
the efforts of his agents in Istanbul as well as his blatant achievements in suppressing 
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the armatols and klephts in Epirus, he obtained a firman calling his Albanian troops 
to support Grand Vizier Yusuf Pasha’s army against the alliance.104 His contributions 
to the Ottoman defense along Danube and in Belgrade would be awarded soon by the 
title of derbendler başbuğu, the office which he held in practice for some time as the 
kahya of the short lived başbuğ Hacı Ali Pasha. This crucial post conferred on Ali 
Pasha additional privileges and authority over other pashaliks which facilitated the 
installment of his rule gradually in the whole of Rumelia.  
 The anarchy in Epirus resulting from the incessant conflicts between the beys 
for the pashalık of Ioannina, which was vacant at that time incited Ali Pasha’s 
ambitions to expand his rule there. After a couple of unsuccessful military campaigns 
to crush the local beys, the Porte’s refusal of his solicitations for the pashalık and 
Sultanic orders prohibiting his interference to the city, Ali Pasha’s agents sent a 
forged firman to the inhabitants dictating their surrender, threatening them with 
complete massacre in case of further resistance and announcing him as the new pasha 
of Ioannina.105 Then the city surrendered including the local beys who had barely 
postponed their own conflicts and allied against Ali’s aggression. Ali Pasha stationed 
a deterrent garrison into the city without delay and gained many adherents among the 
notable inhabitants of the city by promising protection of life and property, posts in 
his court and even considerable amounts of riches from the booty. He also soothed 
the tension in Istanbul and regained his credit by marching against the rebel Bushatli 
Kara Mahmut Pasha. In addition by using the tool of bribery so cunningly he 
established significant links with the high rank bureaucrats who would shape the 
decision of the Porte about him. Thus the Porte acknowledged his treacherous seizure 
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of the pashalık by a fait accompli officially and he was recognized as the Pasha of 
Ioannina in 1787.106 
 
4.3 THE SULIOT AFFAIRS 
 His subsequent gains in terms of territory and offices ascended him to a 
formidable Bey from a frugal bandit chief. So intimidated by this rapid consolidation 
of power, many of the local Beys of Southern Albania and Northern Greece yielded 
to him without much resistance. Enjoying the feebleness of his rivals, Ali Pasha 
undertook several military operations and annexed the territories on the way to his 
hometown Tepedelen. By conquering, Klissura, Premeti, Ostanitza, Konitza, and the 
entire Acarnania he added a vast territory along the river Aous to his dominions and 
extended his sway to the North. But the Suliots, a confederation of the Greek 
speaking Albanian tribes of Christian creed from the high mountains of Southwestern 
Epirus, who had remained semi-independent from the Ottoman control in their 
inaccessible country, constituted a fierce challenge against his authority and further 
conquests.  
 The Suliot community was consisting of a few hundred Albanian families 
belonging to the nineteen tribal federations of ancient origin, which were called faras 
scattered around more than sixty villages.107 Among these faras the most potent were 
the Zervates, Botzarates from Dragani, Drakates from Martani, Busbates from 
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Lakohoria, Dagliates from Fanari, Tzavellas, and Pasates.108 Due to the geography of 
their land with rocky soil and high mountain ranges covered with dense forests, 
almost no agricultural output was produced. They relied mostly on forestry, raising 
sheep herds but much more than that ransoming, robbery and pillage. As a closed 
community dwelling in a mountainous region they retained their barbarian features 
like vendetta which fostered constant warfare among the faras. But this barbarian 
character of the Suliot community rendering them quite prone to warfare boosted by 
the scarcity of resources for subsistence and a high level of loyalty to the kinsmen, 
led them to act in unison against the external threats despite the antagonisms inside 
their communities. Their constant preparedness for war and mobility together with 
their geographical advantage that enabled them to attack and quickly retreat to their 
inaccessible country rendered them almost invincible. Their leading connection with 
the Ottoman Empire was the Harac, the poll tax exacted from the non-Muslims 
which sufficed them to retain their independence.109Even their women were familiar 
with warfare participating in clashes when needed. At the outskirts of their 
mountains there were villages attached to their confederation assisting them secretly 
with provisions when they fled deep into the forests in the high mountains. The 
Suliots often allied with the foes of Ali Pasha and received some degree of assistance 
from the Albanian Beys, Russia, France, Greek armatols and inhabitants of the 
Ionian Islands. Not only did they constitute a great challenge towards the expansion 
of Ali Pasha’s authority in terms of material destruction and loss of men but also 
their long-lived persistence in defending their mountains symbolically overshadowed 
his glory. 
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 Ali Pasha’s first great campaign against the Suliots was held in 1792 in which 
he aligned with Beys of Margarithi and Paramithia. Since their territories were also 
adjacent to Suli they were in constant struggle against the terror of the Suliots. The 
pasha once again resorted to his exclusive talent in conspiracy and intrigues after 
collecting his troops. Too prudent to take the risk of directly attacking the wily 
Suliots the pasha arranged a cunning conspiracy. He wrote to chiefs of Suli inviting 
them to participate in a joint operation against their common enemies the Beys of 
Argyrocastro.110 Despite the endless clashes between the Albanians this sort of 
temporary alliances were common among them. Then the Suliots responded to the 
invitation by sending a token force led by Lambros Tzavellas to inquire about the 
pasha’s real intentions. Then the Pasha took them as hostages offering Tzavellas his 
freedom and even riches on the condition that he would join his side and work for 
him as an agent among the Suliots.111 Pretended to have accepted the offer with 
content he turned back to Suli where he exposed the intrigue to the leaders of the 
Suliot tribal confederacy. Then the Suliots decided to extend their assaults against 
Ali who had already been informed of Tzavellas’s treachery and attacked the village 
of Kiafa in the Suli territories beforehand. But this very attempt resulted with a 
severe defeat of the Pasha’s forces though they managed to kill Tzavellas. Not only 
did he lose men and prestige but also he was forced to pay high amounts of ransom 
to get some of his best warriors back from the Suliots. But he was determined not to 
detach from the affairs of Suli. Georgios Botzaris a notable chief in the Suliot 
community in Lakia was controlling the faras on the frontiers of Suli and his conduct 
towards the neighboring Beys including the pasha was peaceful unlike the rest of the 
chiefs thanks to the satisfactory amounts of bribe paid by the Beys. Having 
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guaranteed Botzari’s abstinence from interfering to the forces marching to Preveza 
via a narrow mountain pass in his lands Ali Pasha crushed their defenses in Nicopolis 
and occupied Preveza in 1798. More than that Botzaris’ adhesion and defection led 
him even attack his kinsmen. Although he was killed soon, the pasha prospered in 
installing new dissensions among the tribes weakening their traditional solidarity 
against foreign enemies and made great use of Botzaris in the conquest of Preveza. 
His victory in Nicopolis and conquest of Prevesa alleviated the disgrace in the 
aftermath of the great campaign in Suli to a certain extent. In fact Preveza was the 
second eminent source of provision for the Suliots after Parga, which would be the 
pasha’s next target unless the Ottoman-Russian forces arrived. 
 More Albanian Beys joined the operations against the Suliots as their 
resistance remained solid and the destruction of their swift raids to the Albanian 
villages even got severer. By 1801 Ali Pasha conglomerated a series of remarkable 
beys most of whom were literally his enemies and organized another large scale 
campaign against Suli. Pronio Aga, Mahmut Dagliani, Hasan Zapari, Mustafa Ziguri, 
Ibrahim Khemi, Suleyman Coban, Bekir Giocatore and even Ibrahim Pasha of 
Avlona aligned with the pasha.112 This time a significant number of Suliot warriors 
were slain and numerous villages in Suli were captured. But applying the most 
efficient tactics of guerilla warfare the Suliots under the leadership of Foto Tzavella 
and Dhimo Draku repelled the attacks of the allied forces retaining their positions in 
the higher ranges of Suli. The failure to break their resistance totally demonstrated 
the necessity of altering the strategy used by the allies. At length Ali Pasha built a 
chain of watchtowers along the precipitous Suliot frontiers. The towers were fully 
soldiered and armed to detain any possible movement from the mountains. They 
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would also serve to cut the communication and transportation towards the high hills 
of Suli. Hence a long-lasting blockade was set out rather than laying sieges and 
pursuit operations with huge forces. In fact it was impossible to control the whole 
area surrounding Suli by building towers and deploying forces. The Suliots somehow 
refreshed their provisions from Parga and also found means to carry off food and 
horses from their occupied villages.113 Then the pasha resorted to futile efforts like 
demanding from Hierotheus, the metropolitan of Ioannina, to write the bishop of 
Parga and convince him to use his spiritual authority to prevent the help of the 
Parganots to the Suliots.114 
 The loose bonds that connected the Beys in the alliance to Ali pasha’s cause 
concerning the Suliot affairs were to be unraveled soon. The intrigues of the pasha 
for seizing the castle of Delvino and his final conquest in 1802, which dispossessed 
Mustafa Pasha from his hometown, dissolved the moribund alliance. Ibrahim Pasha, 
Pronio Aga and Mahmud Dagliani started to furnish the Suliots with all sorts of 
provisions.115 As a response to that move Ali Pasha offered peace to the Suliots with 
some stipulations like exiling Foto Tzavella, admitting Kitzo Botzari as the governor 
of Suli and guaranteeing not to target his territories. On the other hand the 
interference of the French by sending ammunitions to Suli alarmed all neutral 
neighbor tribes and led them to side with the pasha. The Porte also urged the pasha to 
reduce the Suliots by releasing a firman summoning all local beys to join the 
operations. In the meantime the blockade on Suliot hills was elevated to the strictest 
level thanks to the contributions of the Tzamidhes and the Armatols. Suffered by 
intense famine and lack of weaponry the Suliots had to retreat to a few strongholds 
and transfer some of their population to Parga as well as the islands. The serial 
                                                 
113 Leake mentions about the arrival of a serious amounts of powder and lead from the French. p. 517 
114 Leake, p:513 
115 Hughes, pp:142-145 
 47 
 
attacks of the vigorous alliance under the command of Veli pasha to the last points of 
resistance Kiafa, Samoniva and Dala were repulsed by the feeble remainder of the 
Suliot warriors. Now it revealed that once again the result of the war would be 
determined chiefly by the power of gold rather than the power of arms. The Suliot 
traitors, Kutzonika and Pylio Gusi, after receiving a satisfactory quantity of purses 
from Veli took some soldiers of the pasha inside their houses at midnight.116 Backed 
by a swift general attack on Suli the intruders captured two of the villages slaying 
many of the defenders and forcing the rest to retire up to Kiafa who were left no 
chance but to surrender soon. In sum the pertinacious resistance of the Suliots against 
the pasha ended by December 1803 by an agreement signed between the Suliots and 
the concert of neighbor Beys under the leadership of Ali Pasha.117 According to the 
agreement Suliots would evacuate the entire Suli territory with their movable 
properties and they would be allowed to depart and settle securely in a distant 
location they wished. But as the evacuation began Ali Pasha found no benefit in 
keeping loyal to the terms of the agreement and massacred the Suliots who left their 
mountain forts.118 A tiny group could flee and took refuge in Parga under Russian 
protection where they would transfer to Corfu. Thus the Suliot resistance perished 
opening the way for the conquest of the entire Epirote coast and the loosen allegiance 
of numerous local beys was now to be strengthened by the intimidation of the 
Pasha’s treacherous triumph. 
 The suppression of the Suliot challenge as well as the destruction of other 
Kleft groups fortified the authority and prestige of the pasha in the Balkans.  
Gradually his pashalık became a safe haven for the merchants and international 
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trade.119 He found solid pillars for his sovereignty in the pashalık among the 
merchants since he provided a dissimilar level of security for trade. This alliance 
with the merchants not only accelerated his rise but also the development of 
international trade in the pashalık facilitating his contact with the foreign powers. 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
 
ALI PASHA AND FRANCE 
 
 
5.1 RELATIONS UNTIL THE RUPTURE BY THE OTTOMAN CAMPAIGN AT 
VIDIN 
 
 The French conquest of Italy and the collapse of the Venetian Republic by the 
treaty of Campo Formio in 1797 altered the balance of power politics in the 
Mediterranean. France annexed the whole territory of the old Republic of Saint Marc 
including the Ionian Islands and their mainland dependencies along the Albanian 
coast. This annexation generated the reasons and the means of the relations between 
the French and Ali Pasha by introducing the French to the Adriatic, Ionian Sea and 
even Epirus as the heir of Venice. 
 The Ionian Islands and the coastal towns of Butrinto, Parga, Arta, Vonitza, 
Preveza the ex-Venetian territories seized by France mainly relied on the supplies 
provided from Albania in terms of food, livestock, wood, resin etc. The assurance of 
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this critical logistic supply was fundamental for the subsistence of the troops as well 
as the local population there.. Thence the Republic of Venice had always pursued 
subtle policies to keep in good terms with the autonomous Beys of Albania at the 
vicinity of its territories. France as the new sovereign of these locations was not 
immune from this indispensability either. On the other hand Albanian grain and 
wood was crucial for the French troops on the Italian peninsula. Besides these 
regions were of great strategic significance since they constituted one of the few 
crossroads of trade between the East and the West in the Mediterranean. This fact 
was also admitted and even uttered by Napoleon who mentioned in a letter to 
Talleyrand that the Adriatic and the Albanian coast had much more importance for 
French interests than the whole Italy.120 As the most powerful and influential bey of 
Albania of that time Ali Pasha was the leading figure for France to establish 
amicable relations and form a sort of strategic alliance to secure its existence on the 
ex-Venetian territories. Moreover this alliance would serve to sustain its greater 
policy concerning the East including the invasion of Egypt, to control the trade 
routes and to eradicate the British influence in the Mediterranean. Apart from all 
these calculations the French were also in pursuit of spreading the revolutionary 
ideas in Greece and liberating the so-called heirs of the ancient Greek civilization 
from the Ottoman yoke. They were secretly organizing ceremonies where 
enthusiastic discourses on the liberation of Hellas exhilarated the Greeks.121 French 
intelligence officers were establishing contact with the Greek dissidents in the 
Peloponnese spreading rumors of a planned invasion of the peninsula that would end 
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with an independent Greece under the protection of France.122 These propaganda 
activities had a twofold function for the French. They would serve the designs of a 
French-led Greek independence movement. At the same time they would alleviate 
the effects of the worsening French position in the Egyptian campaign.123 A 
formidable Greek insurgence in the Morea would undermine the Porte’s power and 
attention in the Egyptian affairs. But the French intrigues did not provide the 
expected results at least for the Egyptian affairs. However French cooperation with 
Ali Pasha and promotion of his constant attempts for consolidating his power offered 
more visible advantages to the French. Having acquainted with the authority of the 
pasha and his existing capabilities the French were eager to establish permanent 
contact with him. Primarily Ali Pasha’s cooperation could duly serve the policy of 
liberating Greece. In other words the Greek independence movement could proceed 
easier through the evolvement of the Pasha’s existing authority and organized 
government structure. This intersection and amalgamation of basic mutual interests 
laid the foundations of the relations between France and the pasha. However further 
strategic calculations of the pasha were likely to sour the relations without delay. 
Seeking additional means and support to be able to act more independently from the 
Porte, Ali Pasha had his own tertiary plans for the Ionian Islands and the coastal 
towns of the French to be realized in the short run. Had he seized these territories he 
would obtain a remarkable source of wealth by controlling an excessively strategic 
spot of trade in the Mediterranean. The conquest of littoral Albania together with one 
or more Ionian Islands if possible would have enabled him to destroy his rivals 
sheltered by the harsh geographical conditions and the inflexible ban of the former 
Venetian Republic on Ali Pasha’s marine activities. Thus he would gain precious 
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advantage for his military operations by guaranteeing easy access to the country of 
his foes from the sea. In addition Ali Pasha had plans for importing the latest military 
technology and weaponry from the French as well. These contradicting plans and 
interests of the two parts would lead to extremely fluctuating diplomatic relations of 
short lived alliances to be followed by hostilities and then quick reconciliations. One 
of the most remarkable aspects in these relations between the French and Ali Pasha is 
that the maneuvers of other actors namely the Porte, Russia and Britain shaped the 
course of the relations to a great extent and each had to deal with Ali pasha as an 
independent counterpart in time.  
 The Albanian affairs of the French were under the responsibility of Napoleon 
Buonaparte who was the general in chief of the French Army in Italy and the 
architect of the very policy favoring the rapprochement with Ali Pasha. He 
personally engaged in a series of correspondences with him and then directed the 
conduct of his policy via his generals and consequently consuls in the region. 
Relying on the wording of these correspondences it is possible to evince that 
Napoleon encouraged the pasha blatantly to pursue the ultimate design of 
establishing an independent Albanian Kingdom and expressed his alacrity for 
cooperation. However Ali Pasha demonstrated no overt sign of detaching from the 
Porte’s orbit even at the beginning while paying maximum attention to French 
alliance.  
 The first step in installing diplomatic relations was taken after the 
appointment of General Gentili as the Governor of Corfu and the commander of the 
French Forces in the Ionian Isles, by Napoleon with orders to negotiate with Ali the 
possible means of this cooperation. At the first meeting with Gentili, Ali Pasha 
declared his promptness to engage in close cooperation with France and as a 
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prerequisite for his future services he demanded permission to use the Corfu Canal to 
transfer his forces dispatched against the confederacy of some rebel tribes in the 
North of Epirus, namely the Chamouri or Çamlık league formed by mainly the 
inhabitants of Vasilliona-Navitza and Himarra. In fact the rugged geography of 
South Albania with high mountain ranges covered with dense vegetation was a great 
obstacle for subduing independent tribes like the Suliots, Philates and the Himariots. 
Hitherto the Venetians had managed to check Ali Pasha’s power and expansion by 
rigorously keeping the entire Albanian coast including the Corfu Canal closed to his 
vessels.124 But Napoleon found it such a trivial concession for the inauguration of the 
amicable relations with Ali Pasha and let him step into the coastline towards the 
North. But the troubles of the Çamlık league remained unresolved at least for a 
couple of years since further concessions were needed to have a firmer existence on 
the Albanian coast. Consequently Ali Pasha established military facilities, depots and 
a customhouse at Salagora. Moreover he acquired rich fisheries in Santa Quaranta 
and seized the excellent harbor of Porto Palermo on the gulf of Arta that enabled him 
to control the sea trade route reaching Prevesa.125 He also surrounded the territory of 
his strong rival Mustafa Pasha of Delvino. In continuous contacts with Gentili, Ali 
gradually elevated the price of his alignment with the French and listed additional 
demands for being capable of rendering his services adequately. He demanded at 
least four officers specialized in modern canonry, ammunitions, vessels, the right of 
civil navigation and also of trade at the bay of Arta and the strait of Corfu.126 More 
than that, he overtly expressed his pretension to secure access to the Dalmatian coast 
and even establish his rule in the unruly pashalık of Delvino. But all of his demands 
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were not likely to be met by Napoleon who only consented to Ali pasha’s seizure of 
some coastal villages and to send two military specialists to serve in his court. In 
addition Napoleon also ordered the sale of two gunboats to him at a lower price as a 
sign of goodwill and support. Though not satisfied by this agreement Ali assured 
Gentili of his loyalty to France thenceforth. Whilst the 1798 Ottoman campaign 
against the rebel ayan Osman Pasbandoğlu of Vidin in which Ali Pasha also 
participated with his forces was a sort of test for which part he would offer his 
services. Four months after Ali Pasha joined the imperial army before the walls of 
Vidin news concerning the capture of Malta and then the invasion of Egypt by 
France was spread throughout the battlefield leading Ali to return to Ioannina 
urgently.127 He left his son Muhtar as the commander of his forces. As the Porte 
declared war against France and signed an alliance with Russia and Britain Ali Pasha 
soon came to the understanding that he was to reconsider his position and his newly 
developed relations with France before they became hazardous. In fact France 
seemed to be destined to retreat from Egypt and also lose its possessions in the 
Ionian Sea in case of an operation of the Ottoman forces supported by the Russian or 
British fleets against its feeble existence there. The Seven Isles namely Corfu, Zante, 
Cephalonia, Santa Mavra, Cerigo, Paxos, Ithaca together with their dependencies like 
Butrinto, Arta, Prevesa and Parga were already the subjects of Ali Pasha’s ambitions 
for conquest and the role of the loyal servant to the Porte would probably provide 
him the opportunity to capture at least some of those territories either by direct 
conquest under the pretext of crushing the infidels or the granting of them by the 
Porte as a reward for his services in the war. Thus Ali Pasha pretended to be loyal to 
both sides at the initial phase of the war and invited to his court a French officer to 
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discuss what to do after the latest developments lest the French realized his sudden 
policy shift. In fact Ali Pasha encouraged by the French defeat in Abukir was ready 
to unveil his enmity and prepared a conspiracy to the envoy by which he would 
acquire the crucial details of the French defenses in the Isles especially in Corfu for 
his military operations. Following his invitation General Chabot, successor of 
General Gentili, sent his adjutant General Rose to Ioannina to discuss the so-called 
possible steps to be taken by the pasha against the Porte and its allies.128 Afterwards, 
Ali Pasha was acquainted by Rose that Corfu just as the rest of the Isles, was 
incapable of resisting a long siege and the French troops on the Island had an 
inconsiderable number. Just after making sure that an operation on Corfu would not 
face serious resistance and getting the details about the logistics of other islands by 
captious questions Ali arrested Rose and conveyed him to Istanbul to be imprisoned 
in the famous Seven Towers.129 Consequently Ali Pasha sent an ultimatum to France 
demanding the immediate recognition of his authority in Prevesa, Vonitza, Santa 
Mavra and Butrinto, declaring that he would keep Chabot imprisoned until his 
demands including the recent ones concerning weaponry and ammunition were 
absolutely met. In fact the negotiations were in vain since Ali was determined to take 
the side of the victorious and France was far from having that image on behalf of 
him. Having decided to intimidate Ali Pasha and check his capabilities before the 
joint forces arrived Napoleon dispatched armies to Albania. In the meantime the 
pasha sent an ultimatum to the French garrison in Preveza to surrender the city.  
Having rejected surrendering, the French 6th and 79th brigades supported by the 
Prevezans organized their defenses out of the city near the ruins of ancient 
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Nicopolis.130 But the delay in the arrival of the newly dispatched French army left 
the defenders helpless against the Albanians commanded by the Pasha’s himself.131 
Then the pasha inflicted a severe defeat on the French in October 1798 and occupied 
Preveza with ease. This victory cut off the provisions going to the Suliots, augmented 
the prestige of the pasha enabling him to contribute to the forthcoming joint military 
operations of the Ottoman and Russian fleets to the islands. 
 
5.2 MADONNA DI MONTENEGRO AFFAIR: THE FRENCH SLAVES IN 
IOANNINA 
 1798 was also an eminent year for the unofficial relations of the pasha with 
the French that can give hints about his approach to the west. Libyan corsairs 
captured an Italian vessel, Madonna di Montenegro returning from Egypt carrying a 
few reputed French generals, scientists and a high rank member of the French 
Catholic clergy. Among the passengers there were two generals, Poitevin and 
Beauvais, one artillery colonel, Charbonnel, the general commissar of war, Fornier, 
naval officers, Joye, Bouvier and Mathieu.132 In addition to these military officers 
there were also three members of the French High Commission of Arts and Sciences 
dispatched to Egypt; Pouqueville the future French consul in Ioannina, Bessieres and 
Gerard accompanied by the monk Guerini who was the former inquisitor of Malta. 
Soon after, the captives were sent to the ports of Navarino where Joye and Fornier 
were submitted to the Ottoman admiral Kadri Pasha. Then the rest were sent to 
Butrinto to be sold as slaves.  Acquainted with the arrival of the captives to Butrinto 
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Ali Pasha summoned the corsair chief to his court and bought Poitevin, Charbonnel, 
Bessieres, Bouvier and Guérini from him. 133 
 The pasha treated his new French slaves with an unexpected sympathy and 
respect. He promised them their liberation after two years of service, assured them 
about immunity of life, and honored them by gifts. In fact he obtained with ease the 
long awaited French military specialists that the diplomatic entanglements with 
France did not provide him before. He initiated a couple of military rearrangements 
and ordered Poitevin to restore and reorganize the fortifications around the city and 
the lake of Ioannina.134 Besides Bessieres served him to manage his commercial and 
fiscal affairs while Charbonnel taught at the newly established artillery school in 
Bonila.135 Charbonnel was also appointed as the commander of his artillery troops 
and accompanied the Pasha as his personal counselor wherever he roamed in the 
country. The Pasha made great use of Charbonnel’s services and relied much on the 
modern artillery regiments he established in his quick rise as well as in his struggle 
against the local beys like Mustafa Pasha. On the other hand the monk Guérini 
converted to Islam and took his place in the court of Ali Pasha as one of his most 
loyal servants who stayed attached to him until his fall. Molla Mehmet Guérini 
served Ali Pasha as his chief dragoman responsible for all foreign affairs functioning 
like a foreign minister and at the same he served as the imam of his seraglio.136 
 All French captives except Guerini managed to flee from Ioannina and 
returned to France via Corfu. 137  But their departure would not necessarily end their 
engagement with the Pasha. On the contrary their course of fate would be dissimilar 
                                                 
133 Remerand, p:63 
134 Boppe, p:27 
135 Boppe, pp:28-29 
136 Boppe,p:30, Vaudoncourt, p:253 
137 The naval officer Bouvier would organize the tiny fleet of the pasha but he managed to get a 
license from the pasha to leave Janina and rendered no considerable service to him. 
Boppe, p:29 
 57 
 
to that of Guerini since their experiences during the captivity in the court of the pasha 
would lead them to be employed as the intermediaries of diplomacy between France 
and the pasha. In sum the Madonna Di Montenegro affair generated many of the 
protagonists of this diplomacy and a remarkable mass of intelligence about the Pasha 
on behalf of the French that would be utilized in the shaping of the French policy 
with regard to him. 
 
 
5.3 NAPOLEON AND ALI PASHA: POQUEVILLE’S MISSION IN IOANNINA  
 French expansion in the Mediterranean reached its peak by the invasion of 
Egypt in 1798 at the expense of the British and Russians both seeking further 
political and military expansion in the territories of the Ottoman Empire. Hence the 
very interests of the British and Russians converged on assisting the Porte to repel 
the menacing French and an alliance between the three parties did not take too long 
to be sealed. According to the war plans of the alliance between the Porte, Russia and 
Britain the task of purging the French existence in the Ionian Isles was assigned to 
the British- Ottoman joint fleet at first. However the Russian fleet set sail to the 
Ionian Sea with the pretext of the insistent invitations of the inhabitants of the Isles. 
This last minute fait accompli led the British fleet to take course towards Egypt. 
Although the Russian designs concerning the Greek Orthodox inhabitants of the 
Balkans harassed the Porte, no serious objection was seen from the Ottoman side. 
Whilst, Ali Pasha who had been assigned by the Porte to attack the mainland 
dependencies of the French, rapidly occupied Butrinto, Vonitza and additionally 
Gomenitza before the arrival of the joint fleets.138 But he failed to crush the stiff 
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resistance of the Parganots and the tiny French garrison backed by some of the 
Suliots who escaped from the Pasha. In the meantime the joint fleet faced a 
considerable resistance only on the Island of Corfu, which did not surrender until an 
additional land force assembled among the forces of Ali Pasha, his son Veli Pasha 
and Ibrahim bey of Avlona joined the siege operation. As a result the French were 
dispossessed of all their gains after the treaty of Campo Formio, and the Ionian 
Islands were united under the flag of the so-called Septinsular Republic established 
by the treaty between the Porte and Russia in March 1800.  According to the treaty 
the mainland dependencies captured by Ali pasha were conditionally ceded to the 
Porte.  Accordingly the new republic would be under the suzerainty of the Porte 
paying the triennial tribute of 75000 Ottoman guruş having an equal status to the 
State of Ragusa.139 Besides, Russia together with the Porte would guarantee the 
continuity of its sovereignty safeguarding it from any foreign intervention and 
preventing the Muslims from settling on the islands. 140 
 But this joint protection was of no avail for the traditional Russian designs 
related with the Mediterranean and the Balkans. Russian agents adroitly boosted the 
indignation among the masses towards the nobility that was favored by the 
Ottomans, until complete anarchy and disorder ruled over the islands. They even 
stirred up numerous peasant revolts challenging the nobles who were the remnants of 
the Venetian aristocracy and relatively the nominal Ottoman sovereignty in the 
republic. They fomented the resentment and opposition of the magistrates against the 
Catholic nobility to incite the religious enthusiasm namely the Orthodox zeal which 
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would gain Russia a solid ground in the republic as the so called protector of the 
Orthodox world.  Then the Septinsulars invited the Russians to subside the turmoil 
whose interference would also be convenient according to the joint protection clauses 
of the treaty signed with the Ottomans. By the deployment of a stronger Russian 
garrison on Corfu with its auxiliary forces on several islands, the tension was soothed 
but the republic fell under the de facto occupation of Russia. 
 Despite the services and contributions of Ali Pasha during the war the Porte 
refrained from rewarding him by granting him the pashalik of the territories he 
personally captured from the French as he had expected. Moreover he was ordered to 
withdraw his troops from these territories urgently and to deliver them to Mustafa 
Pasha of Delvino, one of his strongest rivals. But his endeavors on the side of the 
Porte were not definitely fruitless. Soon after the peace in 1800, he was appointed the 
governor of whole Rumelia, Rumeli beylerbeyi, and several posts of derbentler 
başbuğu or superintendence of high roads and mountain passes scattered all around 
Rumelia, were united and bestowed on him as derbendat nazırlığı. 141These offices 
consolidated his authority in the whole Rumelia to a great extent though there were 
still enclaves of autonomous beys or tribes like those of the Suliots, pashaliks of 
Delvino, Scutari and Lepanto within the area of his rule.  
 The period between 1800 and 1804 was merely a pause for the diplomatic 
relations between the French and Ali Pasha since loyalty to the Porte gained the latter 
more than supporting the French and nullified temporarily the necessity of resorting 
to foreign support. In fact Ali Pasha was driven solely by rational calculations 
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serving his interests of amassing more treasuries and obtaining as much autonomy as 
possible while keeping his nominal ties with the Porte intact. For Ali Pasha a new 
rapprochement would only be possible if the French could compensate their losses 
and regain their position potent enough to offer him what the Porte would not. On the 
other hand the French also admitted that little could be done in the Balkans and 
especially in Albania and Greece without having amicable relations with Ali Pasha. 
Thus Napoleon personally did not cease his efforts to reestablish the connection with 
Ali Pasha by sending representatives to his court whose missions would finally 
succeed by 1804. Having established his son Veli in Triccala and the elder one 
Muhtar in Ioannina, Ali Pasha was now engaged in fixing his court in Manastır 
enjoying the additional privileges and authorities of occupying the beylerbeyi office. 
He turned his attention towards the Albanian affairs especially crushing the Suliots, 
Klefts together with the neighboring pashaliks as well as strengthening his own 
treasury by imposing heavy taxes to the subjects and converting their occupied lands 
to çiftliks. Among these the most challenging task was fighting against the Suliots, 
the source of the most formidable resistance to his authority in Albania. Ali Pasha 
initiated several campaigns supported by the Porte and even some of the rival 
Muslim Beys to crush the Suliots, but all were doomed to failure despite the fact that 
some Suliot chiefs like the famous Botzari were aligned with Ali Pasha thanks to the 
omnipotence of bribery. Finally the subsequent defeats against the Suliots, which 
proved the harshness of disseminating this warlike tribe by mere military means 
made Ali Pasha, postpone the revival of his diplomatic relations with France to be 
able to deal with the subtle intrigues of local politics. On the other hand the counter 
policy of the French to retaliate against Ali Pasha for his sudden shift of sides 
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reached to providing logistical support to the Suliots. This very policy of retaliation 
also delayed the revival of the alliance between the two. 
 The outcome of the Egyptian campaign was a severe catastrophe for the 
French influence in the East. Not only France was driven out of Egypt and the Ionian 
Islands but its access to the Balkans was inhibited as the British substituted their 
short lived leadership in the Mediterranean trade and the Russians handed over their 
role as the instigator of revolutions among the Christian reaya of Ottoman Rumelia. 
But Napoleon’s elevation to power as the emperor of France by 1804 entailed a 
quick recovery for the French influence in Albania and Greece. After the victory of 
Austerlitz in 1805 and the capture of the Dalmatian coast including Venetian Albania 
Napoleon paid special attention to Epirus and to secure Ali Pasha’s alliance. Unlike 
the British and Russians Napoleon pursued the policy of strengthening Ali Pasha 
paving the way for his independence that would result in a satellite Albanian 
kingdom. At that time the Ionian Islands, Albania and Epirus were viewed as the rear 
gates of the Balkans and also the Ottoman Empire where no great power could 
establish its influence and control properly. Apart from that Philhellenism boosted by 
the ideals of liberating Greece from the Ottoman sovereignty and the revival of the 
ancient Greek civilization, which was considered as the very core of the European 
civilization, was at stake. In fact there was a sort of competition between France and 
England in addition to the competition for dominating the Mediterranean trade, for 
the realization of these ideals that triggered the flood of countless European 
archeologists, historians, poets, adventurers etc. to Ottoman Greece. Ali Pasha who 
emerged as the most powerful ayan in Rumelia was in favor of reviving the relations 
with France without delay since he was aware of the advent of Philhellenism and 
desired to use it for backing his position before the Porte, which was quite 
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susceptible as it had always been for all ayans. More than that, the lack of a solid 
local support or a cause that would strengthen his authority among the reaya made 
foreign assistance indispensable. Thus the immense European interest in the 
liberation of Greece was meant to be manipulated to secure this assistance. There are 
also further motives encouraged him to invest in diplomacy with the French. His 
struggle against the Suliots who received protection and logistical support from 
Britain, Russia and occasionally France was deadlocked. The Russians on the 
Septinsular Republic were in coalition with the wealthy Greek merchants constantly 
preparing for insurgence using the klefts as a military power. The British had also 
proved hostile to his aggrandizement expressing their discontent for his semi 
independent status and designs for independence.  
 Ali Pasha’s admittance of the appointment of Julien Bessieres as the consul of 
the emperor in Ioannina was the commencement of an era of reconciliation in which 
the cooperation and alliance between the two parties would be much more solid than 
the first rapprochement. He was cousin of Marshall Bessieres, one of the favorite 
foreign servants of Ali Pasha, who had pioneered the modernization of his artillery 
force, established ateliers for cannonry and prepared the strategies of his expeditions. 
Julien Bessieres hired a talented agent Dr. F.C.H.L Pouqueville who would carry out 
surveillance activities in Ioannina acting as the personal doctor of Ali Pasha in his 
seraglio, until he would take over the consulate from Bessieres. In fact Pouqueville 
would be the most eminent figure in the history of the diplomatic relations between 
Ali Pasha and France by his mission as the consul of the emperor. His familiarity 
with the traditions, language and culture of the Ottomans after several years of 
captivity in Istanbul as well as his medical career with specialization in the treatment 
of the Oriental Plague facilitated his acceptance by Ali Pasha whose interest in hiring 
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European scientists, military specialists and medical doctors in his court was well 
known.142 At length Pouqueville gained more and more credit in Ioannina as he 
demonstrated satisfactory results in his personal medical services that he rendered to 
the pasha. The official status of Pouqueville was soon to be acknowledged by the 
Porte with a berat allowing him to represent the French emperor in Ioannina. 
Moreover, this berat was accompanied by precious gifts from the sultan as a ritual of 
the protocol to be submitted to Napoleon and to Prince Eugene. Thus the French 
support to the cessation designs of Ali Pasha would be undertaken under the veil of 
Pouqueville’s official recognition by the Porte. Meanwhile Ali Pasha also appointed 
one of his confidents, the Italian monk converted to Islam, Mehmet Guerini to deal 
with his relations with France. Pouqueville’s efforts to reanimate the interrupted 
rapprochement included the recreation of confidence and reintroduction of the Pasha 
to Napoleon as a versatile ally in the region. In other words he ardently took a 
position in favor of the Pasha justifying the deeds and demands of him before 
Napoleon. His letters of advice to the French charges d’affaires Rufen in 
Constantinople encouraged his promotion in the eyes of the Porte.143 
 The preliminary objective shared by the two was to drive the Russians 
immediately out of the Ionian Islands who were propagating revolutionary ideas 
among the Orthodox populations including the Serbs in Dalmatia and wealthy Greek 
merchant families in Albania opposing the consolidation of the French influence as 
well as the authority of Ali Pasha.144 Hence the Russian military existence on the 
Islands inhibited the penetration of the French to the Balkans from the west and at 
the same time defied Ali Pasha’s rise. To sum up, this shared understanding of threat 
seemed to be sufficient for the rebuilding of the alliance. But Napoleon also had 
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greater projects for the entire Balkans by which he gave the mission to eliminate the 
Russian threat from the seaside to Ali Pasha, supported the beys of Bosnia and North 
Albania against the Austrians and finally sent troops and a couple of distinguished 
military specialists to provide assistance to the Ottoman army fighting against 
Pasbandoğlu in Vidin at the vicinity of the Russian forces. In other words, 
Napoleon’s alliance with Ali Pasha and encouragement of his ambitions for 
independence was nothing but a fragment of the French policy of containing Russian 
and Austrian expansion in the Balkans; creating a suitable ground for his own. As the 
initial sign of support to Ali Pasha, Sebastiani, now the French Ambassador in 
Istanbul, spent great efforts to ensure the granting of the pashalik of Morea and 
Lepanto, both of which had crucial strategic importance for containing the Russians, 
to Ali Pasha’s sons Veli and Muhtar.145  More than that, the Pasha himself was also 
granted imperial permission to occupy the rest of the ex-Venetian territories on the 
mainland, which brought him the pashalik of Prevesa soon. But military aid was still 
a matter of controversy for both sides. Ali Pasha emphasized that the greatest threat 
was coming from the Russians on the islands and it was mandatory for him to evolve 
his forces from tribal warriors to a deterrent regular army. Nevertheless the incessant 
demands of Ali Pasha for obtaining French military aid in terms of training and 
equipment had always been replied by meager supplies of ammunition, canonry and 
assignment of small regiments of artillery commanded by a few middle rank officers. 
Among these officers Hacı Nicol Papasoglou of Greek origin was the most eminent 
figure. He had been assigned to recruit mercenaries among the local population to 
join his army called Chasseurs d’Orient for French operations in Dalmatia.146 This 
was a sort of legion commanded by Greeks and soldiered by Slavs which had proven 
                                                 
145 Pouqueville, p:352 
146 Boppe, p:66 
 65 
 
quite successful in the French attacks against the city state of Ragusa. This time a 
similar legion would be gathered among the Albanians to confront a possible Russian 
aggression and Ali Pasha, though he was resented by the degree of military aid, not 
only allowed the recruitment of Albanian mercenaries in his territories for this 
Greek-Slavic legion but also hired Nicol as the commander of his own troops.  Thus 
the long disputed French military aid was realized via allocating funds for 
mercenaries without dispatching a noticeable number of French soldiers. Whilst, the 
Porte reconciled with France by the end of 1806 and even furthered the relations to a 
military alliance against the aggression of Russia. Russian rapid advance through 
Walachia and Moldavia abrading the Ottoman existence in the Balkans led to the 
Porte’s closure of the Bosporus to Russian vessels inhibiting the provision of 
logistics to its troops on the Seven Islands. These developments donated Ali Pasha 
the opportunity for furthering his demands from the French and even insisting on the 
handing over of Corfu to his sway.147 Driven by the objective of achieving means to 
control the trade corridor between Italy and the Balkans, Ali Pasha sought to capture 
at least one of the larger Ionian Islands and this time he simply took the highest bid 
by demanding from Napoleon the recognition of his sovereignty on Corfu, the largest 
and most eminent of the Seven Islands. Thus Ali Pasha would back the feeble French 
existence in Dalmatia by checking the Russians on the Islands, preventing them from 
sending reinforcements to Cattaro under French siege and even eliminating the lesser 
number of their troops on the smaller islands. 148 In turn he would acquire a 
remarkable hub of trade, a wealthy community to levy the highest harac as well as 
an extremely strategic checkpoint controlling the exit of the Adriatic to the Ionian 
Sea. But Napoleon favored a procrastinating policy towards Ali Pasha’s territorial 
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demands rather than negotiating the cession of the aforementioned lands with clear 
terms or rejecting them totally until the final reconciliation with the Russians by the 
Tilsit Peace. In 1807 France released a comprehensive military aid package to the 
pasha consisting of one gunboat, one corvette, 50 artillery men with several officers, 
ordinances and military stores via the Kingdom of Naples.149 By this appeasing 
supply of military aid the pasha’s detachment from France was postponed if not 
halted. Though retaining the so-called ally role and reflecting complete compliance 
to Napoleon’s instructions in the official correspondences and talks after the delivery 
of the military aid, Ali Pasha did not refrain from undertaking preparations for 
attacks against the Islands. He built fortresses, military stores along the tiny coastline 
he controlled and at the same time continued his efforts to convince Napoleon about 
his military operation plans at least to the nearest islands if not Corfu. Consequently 
a fait accompli that would not receive a deterrent reaction from France was on the 
way. Furnished by the French military training, artillery and gunboats he laid siege 
on the island of Santa Mavra in spite of his failure to convince the French about 
neither Corfu nor any other island in the Ionian Sea. Meanwhile the Porte also 
opposed his move and ordered the immediate retreat of his forces.150 Chasseurs 
d’Orient recruits, an artillery regiment commanded by the French Colonel Guillaume 
Vaudoncourt and the French destroyer Le Requin served in the vizier’s army 
inflicting a severe destruction on the Russian defenses on Santa Mavra.151 
Simultaneously his forces attacked Parga the last unconquered ex-Venetian town on 
the Albanian coast but failed to break the Russian resistance. Insistent on his designs 
for the two Ali Pasha sent Mehmet Guerini with a deputation to the Tilsit Conference 
endeavoring to take part in the negotiations and realize his designs by diplomacy at 
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the highest level.152 He intrigued on behalf of the Russian and French 
plenipotentiaries to secure a promise for the cessation of land and lobbied for his 
master’s claims about the importance of the demanded territories for his nascent 
Greco-Albanian kingdom.153 The conclusion of the Tilsit Peace ceding the Ionian 
Islands back to the French once again nullified Ali Pasha’s efforts on Santa Mavra 
and Parga. Having received the note of Napoleon urging him to retreat from Santa 
Mavra and reminding the repossession of the ex-Venetian lands by France, Ali Pasha 
had to quit the ongoing operations. Just after the disappointing outcome of Tilsit, Ali 
Pasha refreshed his last diplomatic maneuvers towards the French for the last time by 
demanding only Parga.154 At the same time he elevated the duties on grain, wood and 
livestock exported from Albania to the Isles to deter the French who were in urgent 
need of cash as well as all sorts of logistics. But it revealed soon that the diplomatic 
means had almost no benefit for Ali Pasha who gave the highest priority to capture as 
much territory as possible from the Ionian Islands and their single remaining 
dependency Parga at any cost. 
 
5.4 THE SPLIT: NAPLOEON CONFRONTS ALI PASHA BY THE ALBANIAN 
LEAGUE 
 The Tilsit Peace evolved Ali Pasha‘s relations with France from a sort of 
loose cooperation based on mostly mutual promises rather than concrete actions to 
blatant enmity since both sides remained insistent on claiming sovereignty on the ex-
Venetian territories in the Ionian Sea and the Albanian coast. Following the peace 
treaty France paid much more intention to other beys of Albania and even sought an 
Albanian league against Ali Pasha whose contact with the British turned into an 
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alternative alliance. In fact the existence of a British fleet in the Adriatic and Ionian 
Sea together with the increasing possibility of a British expedition joined by Ali 
Pasha forced the French to decide whether they would accept his territorial demands 
like the cession of Parga or they would seek his rivals’ alliance to achieve a sort of 
counterbalance. French military capabilities on the Isles as well as in the Dalmatian 
coast relied solely on the logistics and provisions sent by the Kingdom of Naples. 
But the optimal source of provisions was mainland Albania which was for the most 
part under Ali Pasha’s control. On the other hand patrolling and blockade activities 
of the British fleet in the Ionian Sea hardened the provisions from Naples and 
deepening the economic shortage there. Thus having secure access into mainland 
Albania was fundamental for the continuation of the French existence on the Isles 
and it required the detainment of Ali Pasha’s aggression.  
 The last series of negotiations with France were held in 1807 by Sehri Efendi 
the second minister of state in the pasha’s court who addressed to Cesar Berthier 
Governor of Corfu Ali Pasha’s demands concerning Parga. However both sides had 
already decided about their next move which would do nothing but finalize the short 
lived cooperation. In fact the nature of the talks was of a mutual ultimatum. The 
arrival of the Parganot deputation requesting help and protection against the 
aggression of the pasha was utilized as a pretext to reject his demands. Besides 
Berthier’s prompt declaration urging Ali Pasha to withdraw from the other mainland 
dependencies, Butrinto and Preveza, displayed the degree of discord between the 
two. Finally Berthier announced the annexation of Parga to the Septinsular Republic 
under French protection. Then the immediate response was in the form of additional 
financial and commercial sanctions imposed on the French. Ali Pasha elevated 
tremendously the already increased duties on agricultural products and livestock 
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exported to the islands. Furthermore, he prohibited all sorts of loans to French 
entrepreneurs, government authorities and citizens of the Septinsular republic. 
 Corfu became the center of opposition to the tyranny of Ali Pasha through the 
contacts of general governor of the Ionian Islands Bessieres and the General 
commissar Cesar Berthier with the tribal leaders and beys of Albania. Klefts, Greek 
Armatols, Muslim Albanian beys and Suliots seeking French protection sent their 
representatives to Corfu to discuss the details of the league against Ali Pasha by the 
end of 1808. But the sudden capture of the four islands by the British fleet, leaving 
only Corfu, Santa Mavra and Ithaca to the French triggered the Albanian league’s 
attacks against Ali Pasha much earlier than expected. 155Whilst the outbreak of a 
Greek peasant revolt in Thessaly under the leadership of the armatol captain 
Enthyme Blachavas for which Ali Pasha needed to spare a significant force 
encouraged other resented Albanian beys to join the league.156 In addition the 
anarchy Blachavas caused, blossomed other uprisings led by Demetrio Paleopoulo 
and Niko Tzaras two celebrated kleft chieftains who were propagating their schemes 
of overthrowing the tyranny of the pasha and even establish a Greek government. 
Although they were far from achieving their ends they contributed to the 
preparations of the Albanian league by keeping a serious number of the pasha’s 
troops in distant locations away from the league’s predetermined points of attack. 
Finally Ibrahim Pasha of Berat assembled all formidable enemies of Ali around 
himself like the former pasha of Delvino Hasan Zapari, Pronio Aga of Margariti, 
Hasan Tagliani Aga of Konispoli, the Beys of Chimera, Xeromeros, Chamouri, and 
the Suliots. As the revolt in Thessaly spread throughout Macedonia, the Albanian 
league assisted by the French artillery regiments commanded by François Chaise 
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initiated attacks against Ali Pasha’s territories. Meanwhile the French ambassador in 
Istanbul was negotiating with the Ottoman high rank bureaucrats the means of 
persuading the sultan to declare Ali Pasha as a rebel. But as Ali Pasha overtly allied 
with the British by 1809, opening his ports to British merchants and navy, supplying 
them with all sorts of provisions in return for procuring assistance of the British fleet 
in his operations and receiving modern weaponry like the newly-invented Congreve 
rockets and fine artillery, the French military aid to the league became ineffective.  
On the other hand the revolt in Thessaly quickly degenerated and turned into mere 
brigandage coupled by massacres victimizing both the Greek and Muslim 
populations. Then the public support to the revolt faded drastically and Muhtar Bey 
crushed Blachavas’ rebels with ease. On the other hand the Albanian league was far 
from maintaining its coherence and military might, as Ali Pasha was too generous in 
delivering them great amounts of gold in return for reconsideration of their positions. 
Besides he reconciled with the chiefs of Chamouri, Margariti, Paramythia and also 
the Chimeriotes. Having guaranteed the inaction of some beys in the alliance and 
furnished his forces with the British military aid Ali pasha marched against Berat and 
laid a siege on the chateau of the father in law of his two sons Ibrahim Bey in 1809. 
Thanks to the British military aid including the newly invented rockets under the 
direction of British officers Ali Pasha won a quick victory. 157As a result Ibrahim 
was forced to surrender Berat and fled to Vallona leaving vast territories of his 
pashalik to Ali Pasha. In fact the conquest of Berat was realized without the 
knowledge and confirmation of the Porte.158 But Ali Pasha dispatched envoys and 
informed the Porte that Ibrahim was in attachment with the unruly insurgents in 
upper Albania and established close ties with the Russians as well as the French to 
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secure his independence. Besides he presented a forged scenario of revolt in Berat 
and asserted that the inhabitants were about to execute Ibrahim unless his forces took 
control of the city and suppressed the rebels. 159Apart from using these pretexts he 
delivered a crucial amount of gold in the capital for the acknowledgment of his 
conquest as well as appointment of his son as the pasha of Berat. At last the Porte did 
not demonstrate any negative reaction to these developments and conferred the 
government of Berat to Muhtar. Thus Ali Pasha’s dominions spread through the rich 
plains of Musachia, the most fertile province of Albania, and his eminent rival 
Ibrahim Pasha received a fatal blow by losing massive lands including his 
hometown.160 
 As France started to lose ground in Greek affairs by the swift advent of the 
British to the Ionian Islands, French conspiracies against the pasha gained higher 
frequency. Despite their adherence to the British some Greek revolutionary circles 
were not totally indifferent to the possibilities of any French support. Theodoros 
Kolokotronis and Ali Farmakis the most famous kleft leaders of their time initiated a 
stiff joint rebellion in the Morea. Without delay, they appealed to the French 
unfolding their plans to General Donzelot for propagating the revolt and 
overthrowing the tyranny of Ali together with his sons from Greece by their 
assistance.161 In fact Donzelot employed all his skills in depicting a quite 
encouraging scheme of French assistance to the rebels that would secure the 
establishment of a so-called independent government. Donzelot’s generous offerings 
included 500 French artillerymen and 5000 Greek mercenary in French pay, one 
Corsican regiment, all means of transport and additional funds to recruit 
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mercenaries.162 Moreover the French would soothe the tension in Istanbul and 
convince the sultan that the rebellion was not against the Porte but against the 
tyranny of the pasha. Thanks to the preliminary funds Donzelot supplied, the rebels 
recruited more than 3000 mercenaries among the pasha’s foes. Nevertheless the 
formation of the Duke of York’s Greek Light Infantry regiments following the 
British occupation of Zanta in 1809 the rebellion and attempts of cooperation with 
the French abruptly vanished. As the British propaganda and generosity prevailed 
over that of the French, Klefts started to enter British service in masses by joining the 
aforementioned regiments.163 Even Kolokotronis took his place with the rank of 
captain in these regiments to whom Britain owed much for their distinctive efforts 
during the occupation of the Ionian Islands.  
 Determined to disperse the members of the Albanian league, Ali Pasha 
eliminated the possibility of further French support to his enemies by encouraging 
the British to retain the blockade at Corfu and some Northern Albanian ports. Among 
the league Pronio Aga of Paramithia and Hasan Zapari of Margarithi both of whom 
Ali Pasha signed a temporary peace before his operation to Berat were the next preys 
of his troops.164 After consequent operations of Omer Vryoni, one of the confidents 
of Ali Pasha, they capitulated showing little resistance and finally perished in the 
dungeons of Ioannina. On the other hand Ibrahim Bey, exiled in Avlona, revived his 
relations with France and engaged in a series of diplomatic correspondence with 
Paris offering the city of Avlona to the French to encourage them for an operation 
against Ali Pasha which would also restore his rule in the more eminent province of 
Berat including the fertile Musachian Plains. Ibrahim Pasha’s efforts to compensate 
his losses and recover the desperate situation of the Albanian league in its struggle 
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against Ali Pasha were in vain since the French position in the Peninsular War in 
Spain worsened to a great extent by 1810. Thus France denied his offer stressing its 
intention not to sour its already fragile relations with the Porte by annexing a part of 
the Ottoman territory. The critical scarcity of food in Corfu was another fact that was 
binding the French to seek any possibility of convincing the pasha about alleviating 
the blockade or violating it in secrecy. The Albanian league so desperate to refresh 
the French support and weakened by the last defeats had to conclude a peace with Ali 
Pasha in 1811. Mustafa Pasha of Delvino, Tagliani of Konispoli and Murtaza Bey of 
Argyrocastro consented to send their sons as hostage in Ioannina as a demonstration 
of goodwill and loyalty to the terms of peace. The peace was followed by the issue of 
a sultanic decree granting the pashalıks of Elbasan and Avlona to Muhtar Bey. 
Therefore, just after Berat Ibrahim Bey’s sovereignty was nullified also in Avlona, 
which meant the de juri elimination of the most formidable rival of Ali Pasha in 
Albania. In order to conclude this victory Ali Pasha cut all communication between 
Corfu and Avlona by the help of the British fleet and ultimately marched against 
Ibrahim. Harassed by the rapid advance of Ali Pasha and the penetration of the 
British to Albania on his side, the beys of Chamouri, Gardiki, Zulati, Culoza and 
Ducates were rallied around Selim Bey Kokka the most influential of the beys of 
Delvino and established a second Albanian league. Though France avoided taking 
part explicitly in this struggle against Ali Pasha by sending troops or providing 
military aid it did not refrain from using gold to organize and sustain the league. It 
was well documented by the French that numerous beys and agas of North Albania 
were granted these subsidies in return for contributing to the forming of the league 
with soldiers and weaponry.165 But all was too late to stop Ali Pasha who managed to 
                                                 
165 Boppe, pp:135-137 
 74 
 
gain some followers of Ibrahim in Avlona by bribery. The amount also sufficed to 
secure the betrayal of his two personal servants. Informed by his agents the approach 
of Ali Pasha to the gates of Avlona, Ibrahim fled to the mountains in disguise and 
took refuge in the village of Gardiki. But his servants had already informed the pasha 
about his escape. Meanwhile Mustafa Pasha of Delvino, Selim Bey Coca with the 
chiefs of Liapuria, Gardiki and Argyrocastro assembled their forces to prevent Ali 
Pasha’s expansion towards Delvino. The rapid victories of Omer Vryoni drove the 
league’s forces back to the city of Argyrocastro which surrendered after a brief siege. 
Selim Coca, the chiefs of Argyrocastro and Lipuria barely escaped to Corfu and the 
rest namely Mustafa Pasha and Demir Dosti retreated to Gardiki like Ibrahim.166  By 
this conquest the great valley of Druno, the most populated and fertile region of 
Albania, was seized by Ali Pasha who converted most of the territory to his private 
ciftlik.  
 The remainder of the league, which took refuge in Gardiki prepared for a 
solid defense. They had an advantageous position since the inhabitants of Gardiki as 
well as the troops in the city were all Muslim Albanians some of whom were 
kinsmen of Ali Pasha’s soldiers. Being aware of this Ali Pasha’s Albanian soldiers 
showed great reluctance to fight and this prevented the storming of the city at first. 
Before a total offense the pasha found it suitable to negotiate with the inhabitants to 
surrender Ibrahim. Then the Gardikiots did not hesitate to sacrifice Ibrahim and he 
was imprisoned with his family in Ioannina. But the surrender of Ibrahim would not 
save the Gardikiots to whom the pasha’s final strike was yet to come. Having an 
absolute resoluteness to crush the remainders of the league and also avenge from the 
Gardikiots, Ali Pasha dispatched one of his Greek confidents, Athanasi Vaya to 
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recruit an army among the Greeks most of whom would be klefts to finalize the 
battle. Finally the Greek troops though arrived with retard, forced the defenders 
surrender the city and imprisoned Mustafa Pasha and Demir Dosti.167 By the 
conquest of Gardiki in 1812 Ali Pasha eliminated almost all of his old antagonists 
and became the uncontestable sovereign of Epirus possessing a large territory 
including a long stretch of coast controlling the Ionian Sea and the islands.  
 After the pasha’s victory against the French-led Albanian league, French 
denunciations and threats to the Porte related with the hostile acts of the pasha 
towards France reached its peak. These diplomatic notes were responded by 
conventional assurances of mere clichés without any concrete action and it strained 
the relations of the Porte with France. Henceforth the Porte was engaged in the semi-
confidential diplomatic relations of the pasha with France. The French foreign 
minister Talleyrand and under his supervision the French chargé d’affairs in Istanbul 
Latour Mabourg undertook a campaign of propaganda against Ali Pasha to make him 
fall into disgrace before the Porte.168 They pressured the Porte by repeatedly setting 
forth allegations of aggression and violation of its neutrality due to its unruly pasha’s 
hostile acts 169 Ali Pasha defended himself by stressing the clandestine activities and 
intrigues of the French with the rebels. He also assured the Porte that he was taking 
each and every measure to preserve the interests of the Sultan without violating the 
neutrality as he had ordered.170Though sultan Mahmud II was in favor of eliminating 
Ali Pasha, the Russian advance from the Danubian provinces and the fragile state of 
the Ottoman sovereignty in the Balkans defied by local insurgences impeded his 
removal. In fact the decrease of his credit in Istanbul was rooted when he rejected to 
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join the defenses against the Russians in 1809 by presenting excuses like his old age 
and unstable state of health.171 But at the same time he was personally commanding 
the operations against Ibrahim pasha and the Albanian league. As all foes of the 
pasha vanished by the defeat of Ibrahim the Porte would monitor his moves with 
additional vigilance. The tone of the French notes gradually got harder and finally 
the Porte received an ultimatum from Talleyrand in 1810 threatening to wage war on 
Ali Pasha and cease all diplomatic relations unless the pasha was penalized. The 
Porte’s response was to send a firman to the pasha ordering him to return the boats 
captured from the French and the Corfiots, to submit the French fugitives in his 
court, to expel the British corsairs from Albanian ports and lastly to lift the ban on 
grain transportation to Corfu.172 The Porte appointed an inspector responsible for 
carrying out an investigation regarding the administration of the pashalık and Ali’s 
foreign relations. Ali Pasha was also dismissed from the mutasarrıflık of Ohrid, 
Triccala and Ilbasan as a sanction. As a result the dispatch of an inspector Celal 
Efendi and his dismissal from three of his mutasarrıflıks abated the tension in the 
relations to a certain degree. The Porte also sent instructions to the pasha about the 
necessity of retaining the amicable relations with Britain while soothing the French 
resentment stemming from the blockade on Corfu.173 
  In light of the Ottoman documents delivered to the pasha it is possible to 
view that the period starting from 1812 until the final departure of the French from 
the Ionian Islands after the surrender of Corfu in 1814 passed with unending French 
denunciations about the pasha’s hostile acts towards them and his close relations 
with Britain. The Porte strived to maintain peace with France by ordering the pasha 
to give as much secret concessions as possible to France but also urged him to act 
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with prudence not to abort or damage his relations with Britain. Therefore the Porte 
was pursuing a sort of “imbalanced balance policy” somewhat in favor of Britain and 
this imbalance also accelerated the evasion of the pasha’s relations with France and 
the British domination in Greek affairs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER SIX 
 
ALI PASHA AND GREAT BRITAIN 
 
 
6.1 THE PROLOGUE OF RELATIONS WITH GREAT BRITAIN:  
 
J.P MORIER’S MISSION 
 
 Ali Pasha’s first contact with the British dates back to 1803 when he appealed 
to the British ambassador in Istanbul, William Hamilton, by a letter proposing close 
cooperation against France presenting a list of offerings, as well as the establishment 
of a permanent British consulate in Ioannina. In the very letter Ali Pasha was 
declaring that he was ready to render all the assistance to Britain with regard to 
provisions from Albania like timber, water, food, livestock, horses and allocation of 
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his ports in the Adriatic for military or commercial use.174 He also offered the British 
the right to disembark and station their troops along the coast to garrison any castle 
or build fortifications. Besides he expressed his intention to promote trade between 
Albania and Great Britain. He offered special privileges to the British merchants 
including the permission of cutting down timber in his territories in whatever 
quantity they would demand. 175After a series of correspondence and consultation 
with the British Foreign Minister Hawkesbury, J.P Morier was sent to Ioannina as a 
special envoy of the British Foreign Office. In addition to the basic responsibility of 
negotiating aspects of commercial and logistical cooperation with the pasha, 
Morier’s mission would be to arbitrate between Ali Pasha and the Russians in the 
Septinsular Republic.176 In convenience with the British policy of alignment with the 
Russians against the aggression of Napoleon lasted until Tilsit, Morier worked on 
influencing Ali Pasha to comply with the terms of the agreement between the Porte, 
Britain and Russia concerning the Septinsular Republic. At that time the primary 
concern of Britain was to use Ali Pasha as a shield against the French penetration to 
Greece without reflecting an explicit patronage over the pasha. Morier’s efforts were 
supported by the instructions of the Porte given to the pasha about conducting 
amicable relations with the British and complying with the terms of the tripartite 
agreement. However the Porte also instructed the pasha to cooperate with Britain in 
military affairs and assign a certain number of his Albanian forces to British 
command.177 The British were also concerned with the sympathy of the local 
population especially the Greeks towards the French existence in the region. Fearing 
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a possible French invasion in Greece, Britain needed to eliminate any pillars of their 
influence. Morier was also rendered responsible for assessing the public opinion 
about the French. Furthermore Britain was preoccupied with the enmity between the 
pasha and Russia. In fact Ali Pasha’s ambition for seizing the Islands with their 
mainland dependencies was a source of fierce antagonism against the Russians who 
were overtly hostile to him.178 Since their first step on the islands the Russians 
pursued a policy of protecting the klefts, Suliots, izbanduts or corsairs and also Greek 
insurgents who escaped from Ali Pasha by providing them a safe haven in the island 
of Santa Mavra in particular.179 Additionally their contacts with the Greek primates 
and merchants to stir up a greater insurgence in Ali Pasha’s dominions fostered 
suspicion and antagonism. Molested by the Porte’s tendency to evade the renewal of 
the triple alliance and its recognition of Napoleon’s imperial title, the British strived 
to prevent the realignment of the Porte and Ali Pasha to the French via Ambassador 
Arbuthnot and the special envoy Morier’s missions. For the Porte, Napoleon’s 
victories at Austerlitz, his capture of Dalmatian Coast and the hostile Russian attitude 
in the dispute with the Walachian hospodars were sufficient to lean on the French 
though this alignment would not last long. Besides Napoleon’s generous offerings to 
Ali Pasha like military aid, some of the Ionian Islands and even independence, 
rendered the price of securing his rejection of the French alliance became 
unaffordable for the British. In sum Ali Pasha’s choice in favor of the French 
trivialized the diplomatic efforts of Britain. As a response to the pasha’s choice in 
favor of the French Britain safeguarded the klefts and even assisted their raids on the 
territories of the pasha.180 There emerged roughly two clashing alliances before Tilsit 
one was the axis between the Russians, Great Britain supporting the local klefts and 
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the other France, Ali Pasha and the Porte. But all actors were quite prone to double-
dealings and swift shifts of sides, which would be manifest at Tilsit. 
 
 
 
6.2 THE QUESTION OF PARGA  
 The ill-fated mission of Morier was soon to be followed by Major William 
Martin Leake’s appointment as the special representative of the British government 
in Ioannina.181 Leake had served in a military mission to Ali Pasha assisting the 
restoration of the fortifications in Albania during the triple alliance‘s wars against 
France. Then in 1807 his military mission turned diplomatic and through 
negotiations with Ali Pasha he reinstalled the British influence in Greece and 
Albania. Leake’s mission had a decisive distinction from that of Morier since the 
rapid changes in the political conjuncture after Tilsit shifted the alliances between the 
main actors leading Britain towards the side of the Porte to confront Russia and 
France. In this conjuncture Ali Pasha was no longer to be contained but he ought to 
be supported according to the viewpoint of the British.182 On the other hand Tilsit 
proved to Ali Pasha that the French had no intention to fulfill his demands 
concerning the Islands and their mainland ports. On the contrary the French sought 
every means to contain him by supporting his rivals in Albania and acted with 
extreme reluctance to furnish him with adequate weaponry. The first step of the 
negotiations between Britain and Ali Pasha consisted of scrutinizing the common 
threats and the possibilities in case of cooperation between the two parties. Unlike 
the French, the British advocated the continuity of the Porte’s nominal sovereignty in 
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Greece and Albania and avoided discussing Ali Pasha’s independence at first. Both 
stressed the urgent necessity of expelling the French from the islands leaving the 
greater questions aside to be settled after the French threat vanished. Ali Pasha 
expressed his eagerness to cooperate with the British as well as his need of artillery, 
ammunition and monetary aid to be able to sustain his military power. In addition he 
requested from the British to assist him in his operations against Santa Mavra and 
hand over this nearest and least garrisoned island among the Ionian Islands to his 
sway together with the city of Parga.183 Consensus would not be easy to reach soon. 
In 1807 British authorities replied to his demands by accepting to extend the 
blockade on Corfu to Santa Mavra and dispatch a military aid the size of which 
would be decided after upcoming negotiations.184 However they denied sending 
troops to the siege on Santa Mavra leaving this task to Ali Pasha’s own forces. On 
the other hand no decision could be made about the situation of Parga. This result, 
though not fully satisfying for Ali Pasha, led his accredited agent in London Seyid 
Ahmet Efendi and the British representative Leake to carry out a much more arduous 
diplomacy to conclude the final agreement.185 Ali Pasha announced that he was 
ready to open all his ports to British warships, to provide logistics and to ban all sorts 
of exports and transportation to the Islands as well as to the Dalmatian ports under 
French control. But he remained firm by exhibiting no flexibility with regard to his 
claims about Parga. The pasha also demanded half million pounds of subsidy per 
annum in exchange for exposing his country to French and Russian aggression by 
taking the British side.186 Though no final agreement was concluded concerning 
Parga, the issues of military aid, exchange of intelligence and the use of the Albanian 
                                                 
183 Shupp, p:280 
184 Baggally, p:36 
185 Baggally, pp:37-38 
186 Piers, The War in The Mediterranean 1803-1810, London 1957, p:347 
 82 
 
ports by the British navy were settled. In other words the cooperation was realized in 
logistical means. Ali Pasha also admitted the recruitment of Greek regiments from 
the inhabitants of Morea to be stationed on the islands against the French. On the 
other hand the scheme of an independent Greco-Albanian kingdom was now utterly 
put forward to Ali Pasha by the British. Thus Britain was magnifying the mission of 
the pasha by identifying the Greek revolution and his independence efforts identical. 
Relying on the existent organization and authority of the pasha who enjoyed a kind 
of de facto independence it would be less perilous and burdensome for the British to 
achieve the liberation of the Greeks. Once the liberation took place it would be less 
costly to topple this Albanian tyrant than engaging in subtle revolutionary activities 
without rigorous support from inside the Ottoman system. In accordance with this 
policy the British exposed their so-called projects about Albania to Seyid Ahmet 
mentioning the possibility of this kingdom under the sovereignty of Ali Pasha to 
which all Ionian Islands would be ceded at last with the condition of granting some 
trade privileges and the right use the Porto Panormo Harbor.187 Although no written 
statement or agreement was presented to Ali Pasha these unbinding offerings would 
suffice to keep him attached to the British and to mollify his resentment concerning 
Parga.  
 Now furnished by British weaponry, technical training and money Ali Pasha 
was supposed to act in conformity with the British war plans. Ali Pasha was 
instructed by the British to assist the Austrians to expel the French garrisons along 
the tiny coastline of Dalmatia.188 But having plunged into the quarrel with Ibrahim 
Pasha of Berat Ali Pasha abstained from fulfilling his share in the operation. In fact 
the Albanian troops were not appropriate for siege operations against well fortified 
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garrisons. In addition there was an uncalculated long and rugged route to Dalmatia 
passing from the territories of the most formidable enemy of the pasha.189 Thus the 
failure of the Dalmatian invasion revealed that the British alliance with Ali Pasha 
could bring no offensive advantage. In the meantime the pasha eliminated the 
menace of the two subsequent Albanian leagues formed by the most powerful beys of 
Albania supported by the French. Thus the possibility of the emergence of a serious 
threat from the local beys against his authority was eradicated.  In tandem with Ali 
Pasha’s war against the league the British occupied four of the seven Ionian Islands 
Cerigo, Cephalonia, Zanta and Ithaca in 1809, driving the French to their last great 
stronghold, Corfu. The conclusion of peace between the Porte and Britain in the 
same year generated such an affirmative atmosphere which legitimized to a certain 
degree the latent contact of the pasha with Britain. In addition Ali Pasha played a key 
role in the capture of Santa Mavra by the British in 1810 hoping to get the island 
soon as a reward for his services though no clear agreement was existent about the 
situation of the island. But in general this deal with the British was manifestly fruitful 
for Ali Pasha when compared to his short lived attempts to ally with the French 
which ended to no affirmative result but antagonism and counter conspiracies. On the 
other hand, Ali Pasha’s logistical assistance by opening his ports and allocating a 
vast resource of wood, resin, food, horses etc. was fundamental for the British 
maritime operations. Apart from the logistical support of the pasha, the British 
authorities were allowed to recruit mercenaries among the Ottoman reaya in the 
pashalık and this opportunity not only enhanced the military capabilities of Britain 
but also facilitated its access to the Greek revolutionaries.190 In sum despite the 
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deadlock in the negotiations concerning Parga the output of the very alliance was 
satisfactory for both sides at least at the initial phase.  
 One of the most significant impediments on the way to a concrete final 
agreement about Parga was the opposition of Robert Adair, the British ambassador 
and plenipotentiary in Istanbul, who found Ali’s claims too extravagant and 
unacceptable. Though he repeatedly highlighted the sine qua non nature of 
cooperation with Ali Pasha against France and of strengthening him against his 
rivals, he also suggested seeking the means of alternative maneuvers independent 
from Ali’s effect without souring the relations with him, a proposal that came to be 
admitted by the British government. The unending dispatch of emissaries by the 
inhabitants of Parga requesting British protection rather than Ali Pasha’s rule also 
hardened the settlement of the dispute in favor of Ali Pasha. Besides, British 
suspicions about Ali Pasha’s double dealing, boosted by some intelligence reports 
reflecting hints of secret negotiations with the French following the days of the 
conquest of Saint Mavra, caused a cautious approach towards him. Accordingly the 
British government decided that British interests and cooperation against the French 
would be secured better by keeping the islands undivided. Therefore the already 
controversial issue of ceding any of the islands to Ali Pasha was taken out of the 
agenda though no negative reply was given to him. By the appointment of G. Foresti, 
a young Greek to the consulate in Ioannina in 1810 and the retirement of Leake 
mutual skepticism dominated the relations. The reluctance of the British to conform 
to Ali pasha’s plans concerning the island of Santa Maura and Parga and their policy 
of procrastination reminding that of the French led him consider alternative means of 
conduct. He simply resorted to a policy of mere blackmail declaring that the French 
general Donzelot offered him the immediate cession of Parga for lifting the sanctions 
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he had imposed on the French on Corfu like the very embargo including the ban on 
all sorts of transportation to the island and reproached for the retard in the settlement 
of the cession dispute. 191 In addition to that he erected new fortifications in St. 
George opposite Santa Maura and furnished him with more artillery power than 
agreed before. Thus Ali was reminding his demands to the British once again by 
threatening them implicitly with a possible reconciliation with the French. Informed 
by his agents about the military preparations at Corfu, Foresti made a proposal to the 
Foreign Office in 1811 emphasizing the urgent need of expelling the French from 
Parga. But London considered that Napoleon’s position would not let to a large scale 
operation on the islands and the possible French offensive would be of minor 
importance since the inhabitants of Parga were eagerly seeking British protection. By 
1812 Ali Pasha intensified his ‘diplomatic’ efforts on behalf of the British 
government sending his representative, the Greek dragoman Kolovos, to London to 
present and defend his claims. 192 But the British authorities were indeed confident 
about the impossibility of reconciliation between France and Ali Pasha calling the 
latter’s bluff. They were assuming that Ali Pasha had literally nothing to expect from 
France after his failure in Russia that would trace the beginning of his end except a 
war of propaganda to announce him rebel by the Porte. In fact the French had waged 
this war on Ali Pasha as he turned against them after Tilsit. But the frequency of the 
notes and letters of denounce sent to the Porte full of complaints about Ali Pasha’s 
attitudes towards the French reached a noticeable amount as the French influence 
started to fade in the islands.  
 Resented by the British inaction to fulfill his demands Ali Pasha resorted to a 
fait accompli by sending a note to the French governor at Corfu General Donzelot 
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demanding the immediate cession of the village of Aya, a dependency of Parga 
situated on the frontier. As he received the refusal of the general he occupied the 
village without declaring war in 1814.193 Many of the inhabitants of Aya were either 
massacred or enslaved by the Pasha’s forces. Their territories were allocated to the 
favorites of Ali Pasha and were converted to çiftliks. Following the easy prey of Aya 
Ali Pasha ordered the final conquest of Parga. Then his troops invaded the territory 
of Parga outside the city walls while the Parganots retired to the fortress. The 
inhabitants together with a small number of French troops managed to detain and 
repulse the invaders despite their eminent number of casualties. Terrified by the fate 
of Aya and assured about the possibility of the vizier’s another attempt for conquest, 
the Parganots came to the understanding that French could no longer be the power to 
rely upon since they failed in protecting whoever they supported against Ali Pasha 
hitherto. Then they contacted the commander of the British forces on Paxos, Captain 
Garland, and requested the assistance of Britain against the vizier by presenting an 
intercepted letter of him offering bribe to the French commander of Parga, a Greek 
colonel of the Chasseures d‘orient. Just after Garland’s report arrived, General 
Campbell, the King’s commissioner and the commander of the British forces in the 
islands, sent a detachment to Parga. The British were in favor of occupying the island 
before Ali Pasha and decide what to do after monitoring his next maneuver in the 
new conjuncture. But their major concern reflected an image of having gained the 
will of the inhabitants for the occupation. Afterwards Parganots received a 
declaration from the British stipulating that the inhabitants ought to take the 
possession of the citadel themselves and raise the British flag as a sign of their own 
will to enter under British protection. Armed and organized for the conspiracy The 
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Parganots forced the French garrison in different quarters to yield with a surprise 
attack that left little opportunity to resist.194 The operation was concluded by the 
raising of the flag and the entrance of the British forces into the city on March 22nd 
1814. Soon after the fall of Parga the French surrendered Corfu to the British and 
also its active role in Greek affairs.. 
 The British occupation of Parga was viewed by its inhabitants as a guarantee 
not to enter the vizier’s control. Moreover, they demanded a permanent legal 
unification of the city with the Ionian Islands under British protection. But the British 
seemed to be undecided about the status of Parga, vacillating between retaining its 
possession and leaving it to the pasha until the Congress of Vienna. In the year 1815 
Ali Pasha renewed his demands for Parga by addressing Castlereagh and Earl 
Bathrust the colonial secretary.195 However he was replied with the pretext that the 
case was a part of the issues to be discussed in Vienna. Later on Britain declared that 
in full compliance with the decisions of the convention signed in Paris in tandem 
with the congress of Vienna the status of the islands together with the mainland 
dependencies would be restored as it had been determined by the treaty of 1800. 
Therefore Parga would be ceded to the Porte but this time on the condition of 
compensating the losses of the inhabitants which would have to choose to emigrate 
from the city. The result seemed to be such a favorable one for Ali Pasha having no 
doubt that he would be granted the pashalik of Parga. But the huge number of the 
emigrants, literally the whole inhabitants constrained the Porte’ treasury to release 
adequate funds for the compensation and paralyzed the negotiations from the very 
beginning. Ultimately upon Castlereagh’s proposal, the Porte consented to allow Ali 
Pasha to contribute to the payments and even it offered him the pashalık of the city 
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for which he had strived for so long. Considering the ancient status of Parga 
concluded by the 1800 treaty which was nothing but absolute sovereignty of the 
Porte immune from Ali Pasha’s authority, it reveals that the British rewarded the 
vizier for his cooperation by a tricky maneuver leaving no option to the Porte other 
than seeking Ali Pasha’s financial assistance for the cession of Parga. 
 The negotiations and the long process of cession commenced in 1817 by the 
appointment of the commissioners of both sides. The inhabitants of the city were 
informed of the decision after all preparations were completed by the arduous work 
of the commissioners to value and enlist the estates. J.Cartwright and Hamid Bey 
were the commissioners responsible for the evaluation whose preliminary task was to 
invite the inhabitants one by one to testify before the officials whether they wished to 
leave the city.196 Meanwhile Ali Pasha underwent a couple of intrigues to delay the 
process, saving himself additional time to collect the necessary funds and even lessen 
the amount of indemnities to be paid by threatening some of the Parganots to remain. 
Besides, he dispatched his agents to stir up an uprising against the British which 
would enable him to interfere in the city. But the works of the commissioners were 
already doomed to failure since the question of the olive harvest was not solved. The 
indemnity would diminish provided that the Parganots were given enough time to 
gather their olive crops. As this olive harvest dispute remained unsolved the 
accomplishment of the evaluation was halted. In 1818 new commissioners arrived at 
Parga and reiterated the testimony of the inhabitants which revealed that not even 
one single Parganot desired to live under Ali pasha’s yoke. This time each 
commissioner carried out his own survey and this separate work ended with a serious 
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gap between the values they calculated for the whole estates in the city. 197This great 
difference spoiled the consensus atmosphere and put the relations of Britain with the 
pasha in strain. Having the priority to normalize the relations with the Porte as well 
as with the pasha Britain sought alternative solutions to the crisis. In 1819 the British 
High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands, Maitland, opened a new series of 
negotiations with the Pasha which were concluded with an agreement on the amount 
of the indemnity payment and the methods to be followed during the handing over of 
the city. The fixed amount was almost an average of the calculations of two sides 
namely 150000 British pounds.198 Thus Ali Pasha and the Porte consented to pay two 
times more than their commissioners’ calculation. According to the agreement a 
small regiment of Ali Pasha’s troops would enter the city to make the final 
arrangements for evacuation but the Parganots refused solidly to admit the pasha’s 
forces inside the city before their departure. Hence they were deployed at the frontier 
very close to the entrance of the city. But the British vessels allocated to realize the 
evacuation of the city failed to arrive on time and Albanian soldiers impatient to 
finalize their task accumulated at the gates of the city. The primates organized a 
campaign and called for help from the Greek vessel owners on the Ionian Islands to 
evacuate the city. 199 As a result the transportation was procured by the assistance of 
the islanders. Finally most of the Parganots were settled in Corfu and some 
immigrated to mainland Greece. In May 1818 Britain handed over the city to Ali 
Pasha’s forces after receiving the indemnity.200 
 The last remarkable enterprise in the diplomatic relations with Britain took 
place in 1820 when Ali Pasha was overtly alarmed by the approaching storm from 
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the Porte’s side. In the eve of his revolt he contacted Sir Thomas Maitland, the 
British Governor of Corfu, to discuss the possible assistance of Britain to his planned 
uprising.201 While waiting for the instructions of London Maitland sent Colonel 
Charles Napier to undertake a survey of the military capabilities of the pasha. But the 
pasha could get no official response apart from the personal advice of Napier. 
 The cessation of Parga would mark the last territorial gain of the Ottoman 
Empire in Europe as well as the beginning of Ali Pasha’s fall. The cessation of a 
Christian territory that remained immune from Ottoman expansion even in its gold 
age was a brilliant diplomatic triumph for Ali Pasha. But from this cessation on, his 
relations with Britain would become dormant if not hostile. They would remain 
indifferent to the affairs of the pasha until he was crushed by the Porte. On the other 
hand the inhabitants of Parga who deserted the city by the cessation constituted the 
most ardent and activist circle of the Greek revolutionaries. More than that their 
aversion to the pasha nullified the attempts of him to steer and appropriate the 
revolutionary movements among Greeks. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 The basic motive behind the foreign entanglements of the Pasha seems to be 
securing his autonomous rule and wealth by staying within the limits of the Ottoman 
Imperial system rather than following a project of independence. At least there is no 
plausible evidence to suspect that he had a planned and organized initiative of 
independence. On the contrary his extreme caution and fluctuations of policy which 
always ended up with keeping more loyal to the Porte demonstrate that his main 
objective regarding in foreign relations was using leverage against the Porte to secure 
his existence. However British and French conduct of policy regarding Ali Pasha 
including the discourses of their officials give hints of a designed project of 
establishing a Greco-Albanian kingdom. But this project seems to have been halted 
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as Ali Pasha proved hostile to both powers revealing that he was in pursuit of short 
term gains. 
 The pasha’s foreign contacts were not totally out of the control and influence 
of the Porte. On the contrary the Porte was not only acquainted with most of the 
features in the negotiations between the two European powers and the pasha but also 
it participated in many of them through instructions to him. This partial check on the 
diplomacy of the pasha resulted to a constant hesitation about his possible moves 
towards independence via foreign assistance. Though Ali Pasha always left a spare 
room for acting independent from the Porte and ignored the sultan’s firmans when 
necessary, he never detached totally from the basic circle of the Porte’s European 
policies. In other words the pasha preferred to stay in the Ottoman system and dealt 
with foreign entanglements independently at the same time.  
 The nature of the pasha’s diplomatic relations with France can be portrayed 
with a few simple words: flattery, blackmail, exploitation, deceit and abeyance. The 
pasha responded to the preliminary demands of cooperation coming from the French 
authorities via military officers or diplomats with the highest level of alacrity and 
fondness. Thus the inauguration of the contacts was facilitated by the blandishments 
of the pasha to Napoleon in particular. His official correspondences with Napoleon 
demonstrate how the pasha attempted to present an attachment to the spirit of the 
French revolution and to what extent he exalted its protagonists. Though these were 
no more than symbolic aspects of mere flattery, they probably gained the pasha 
additional sympathy on behalf of the French who were in pursuit of collaborationist 
chiefs or beys in the Balkans for expansion. But when it came to negotiating and 
conducting the terms of that cooperation, the pasha proved not decent enough to 
fulfill what he had offered, preferring a policy of sudden increases in his price of 
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loyalty. On the other hand he always had the priority of keeping the Porte content or 
at least avoided from resenting it, acting quite sensitive in justifying his deeds. To 
serve this end, he never spared gold from his potent acquaintances in Istanbul. In 
other words the changes in the political conjuncture of the constant wars against 
Russia and Austria never sufficed to make him completely turn against the Porte. On 
the contrary he broke with France with ease when he found necessary to demonstrate 
an absolute obedience to the orders of the Porte. Furthermore, he fought against 
France with an excessive zeal unseen in his career. As he viewed the betterment of 
the French position in Europe after the battle of Austerlitz and the Pressburg peace 
he could reinstall himself to the French cause by flattery and artifice. But when it 
came to provide the logistics to the French as it had been agreed he acted with 
caution and often declined to fulfill his promises properly. His avarice and immense 
suspicion resulted from his Kleftic background; together with his resolute plans for 
continuous territorial expansion never let the relations develop towards a systematic 
cooperation for independence. In fact the French probably came to the understanding 
in time that he could only be used for short term logistical purposes and promotion of 
the French trade capabilities. Having perceived the essence of the French approach 
the pasha also viewed them as a source of military technology and equipment to be 
exploited rather than a political force to ally upon for securing his independence. 
Thus he utilized the French military support against the rival tribes and ayans in the 
Balkans as much as he could. As the military aid received from France faded in 
accordance with the alterations in French policy he resorted to blackmail by leaning 
on to Britain as a substitute. But this blackmail would entail the extirpation of the 
French existence in the Balkans which was not such an auspicious event for his 
diplomacy based on double-dealings. 
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 Ali Pasha’s relations with Britain developed through a balance policy shaped 
by mere blackmail and intrigues to maximize the supply of military equipments, 
monetary aid and trade opportunities. The rivalry between the two great powers on 
the Balkan affairs was manipulated and exploited by the pasha. The diplomacy 
between the pasha and Britain simply consisted of the negotiations for what Britain 
could offer to the pasha different from France. For the pasha the answer was as 
simple as the cession of Parga and Santa Mavra to his pashalık. But the British 
though consenting to cede territory to him in principle were hesitant to fix it 
beforehand with the terms predetermined by the pasha. On the other hand the 
possibility of rehiring his services to the French imposed a constant check on the 
British. In fact the pasha never ceased to keep in touch with the French and 
continued his intrigues by secretly violating the British blockade on the islands, 
informing the French authorities about the British plans. But the departure of the 
French depraved Ali from these double-dealings used as additional pillars or trumps 
in his relations with Britain. On the other hand the British proved less controllable 
than the French for him since they had much better relations with the Greeks who 
literally surrendered them all Ionian Islands. Thus the pasha was bypassed by the 
Greek initiative that welcomed the British authority and lost one of his greatest 
advantages to be used in exchange for his territorial demands. He had offered to the 
British authorities to participate in the operations against the French in addition to 
providing logistical supplies. He was probably seeking a fait accompli by occupying 
Parga and Santa Mavra with his own forces. But the Greek uprisings on the islands 
rendered the French defenses ineffective and surrendered the islands to the small 
number of British vessels. In sum the British played the Greek card more effectively 
than the French and confronted the double-dealings of the pasha with excellence.  
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The British also made use of Ali not only in terms of logistics but also in 
reintroducing themselves as attached to the Porte’s amity against the threat of Russia 
and France. These contributions of Ali to heal the damaged relations between the 
Porte and Britain would not yield any political harvest for him on the contrary 
fostered suspicion of the Porte.  
 The fundamental question that arises when analyzing the pasha’s relations 
with these two great powers is whether they were conducted for the pasha’s 
independence. This project of independence seems to the initial instigator of his 
contacts with the west but the courses of both the pasha’s and his counterparts’ 
policies conducted in time reflect a common intention of strategic cooperation in 
terms of logistics and territorial gains rather than a greater project of cessation. As far 
as the British and French are concerned it is evident that they at least pretended to 
have serious projects for establishing an independent Greco-Albanian kingdom under 
Ali Pasha’s rule. But Ali Pasha’s insistent adhesion to the Porte during his close 
diplomatic relations with Britain and France can be considered as a sign of mistrust 
or change of foresight on achieving independence if any via the assistance of these 
great powers. It is possible to consider that Ali Pasha plotted such a consequence of 
independence via foreign support and initiated this diplomacy in convenience with 
this objective. But in the final analysis the development of these relations highlights 
an evident detachment from this presumed cause in each party’s conduct regardless 
of whether these two powers manipulated the desire of the pasha to be independent 
or contemplated to give hand indeed to such a project. The diplomatic pressure and 
counter propaganda campaign of the French against the pasha in Istanbul that 
accelerated his fall displays that this detachment occurred much earlier for France. 
The advent of the French agents who undertook propaganda activities to stir up a 
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Greek revolt in city of Maina in Morea without counseling with the pasha also 
proves that France had omitted the pasha from his designs. As far as Britain is 
concerned, that detachment is viewed as clear as that of the French case. By 1818 
after the cessation of Parga, Britain literally minimized his relations with the pasha to 
commercial issues. Moreover the British preferred to remain indifferent to his fate 
and rejected his requests for help when the Porte declared him as rebel. Ali Pasha’s 
final political moves also indicate that his independence was no longer on the great 
powers’ agenda. In this manner it is notable that the political solitude of the pasha in 
his last years led him to seek ways to align with the Hetairists, the Greek 
revolutionaries against the Ottoman threat. He sent his agents to the revolutionaries 
to gain their collaboration for a Greco-Albanian independent state.202 He even 
announced his conversion to Orthodoxy and declared himself as a member of the 
famous Philiki Hetairia revolutionary organization.203 His desperate attempt to 
appropriate the Greek revolution or at least take a decisive part in it demonstrates 
how distant Britain and France were to the so-called idea of his independence at that 
time. It would be convenient to deduce from these developments that he had to 
continue the two great powers’ project regarding his independence this time on his 
own. Another crucial point about the nature of the diplomacy of Ali Pasha with 
Britain and France is that both had inaugurated the relations with appealing generous 
offers to the pasha like Corfu and barely realized a trivial portion of them. Presuming 
that Britain and France had really invested in his independence plans until his fall the 
level of their generosity in terms of military aid and cessation of territory should 
have been far higher.  
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 The question of Ali Pasha’s independence and the Greek liberation ideal were 
intertwined to a great extent for Britain and France. This dualism indeed was the 
major problematic that shaped their relations with the pasha. After the French 
revolution the political ramifications of the philhellenic zeal coupled with the 
existing imperialist calculations to get the best share from the demising Ottoman 
Empire had generated the western policy of supporting the Greek national 
awakening. But the political specifications of Greece were to determine the method 
and means to be used for this support. Considering the existence of a mighty local 
bey in Greece and south Albania prone to European entanglements, the least costly 
and most rational strategy was to liberate this nominal servant of the sultan first and 
nurture the Greek revolution in the hands of him. This strategy had additional 
immediate advantages for the European great powers like erecting a stronghold 
against the Russian expansion and securing a vast source of provisions both for the 
Ionian Islands and their military forces operating in the eastern Mediterranean. 
Therefore in the eve of such a large-scale nationalist awakening the preparations, 
namely the creation of a Modern Greek nation and consciousness, were supposed to 
be realized under the custody of Ali Pasha. In simplest terms the European 
estimation was that once the independence of the pashalık was achieved, the 
transformation of this new state by overthrowing the Albanian dynasty would not be 
so troublesome since its semi developed statecraft, the foundation of the ultimate 
Greek state, was already dominated overwhelmingly by Greeks. First the French 
came to the scene and put this strategy into practice by encouraging the pasha for 
liberation. As their encouragement was replied by the pashas close interest in 
cooperation, the strategy of testing his capabilities and loyalty to the cause of 
independence was put into use. But the pasha had left little room for having a long 
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preamble for the relations and expected the realization of his demands at the initial 
stage. Impatient to remove the menace of his local rivals and preoccupied by the 
changes in the international politics Ali Pasha compelled the French to ascertain their 
position about this cooperation. But the reluctance of the French to meet his demands 
in terms of military aid and cessation of land derailed the relations towards 
antagonism. As retaliation to the French caution he delayed fulfilling what he offered 
and even increased his demands. Finally the pasha attached himself to the Porte 
stronger than ever and utilized the opportunity of acquiring much of what he asked 
from the French this time by confronting them. But the consequences were not 
completely satisfactory for him after his sharp shift of sides. The Russian penetration 
into the region altered the conditions on which the diplomacy had been built to the 
detriment of the pasha. Russian maneuvers to lead the initiative of the Greek 
revolutionary movement on their own was casting out the pasha and even defying his 
existence. In such a relatively vulnerable position Ali Pasha had to reconcile with the 
French who captured the Dalmatian coast and partially compensated his losses in the 
Ionian Sea. The lack of alternative options for both sides facilitated the 
reconciliation. But this time the French policy was diverted towards establishing 
direct contact with the Greek population in the pashalıks of Ioannina and Morea 
without damaging the relations with the pasha. The dispatch of the French officers to 
various cities of these pashalıks by the approval of the pasha to recruit mercenaries 
and propagate revolutionary ideas namely the Chasseurs d’orient initiative, was a 
fragment of this strategy by which the relations were kept intact and Greeks were 
accessed at the same time. Therefore the pasha admitted an intermediary position 
between the French and his Greek subjects. He also chose to pursue a policy of 
procrastination towards the Porte’s warnings about the revolutionary activities of the 
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French agents in the Morea like the delivery of books of propaganda and secret 
meetings.204 Hence one of the clearest points that can be deduced from his deeds in 
the light of these facts is that he was in favor of a Greek revolt sponsored by the 
French but he strictly opposed to the attempts of the Russians who also arduously 
campaigned to stir up the revolt under their own supervision. It is least likely that he 
gave that concession to the French in exchange of mere military aid. Though he 
received indeed an additional series of military aid including weaponry and 
technicians he had never been content of the quantity of it. The most logical 
presumption seems to be his tendency to view the Greek liberation as an integral part 
of his own independence. In other words he was probably assured of the fact that he 
would be the ruler of the independent Greece at the end of the day. He could not 
struggle to achieve it on his own without receiving western aid, since he had strong 
foes that could eliminate him including Sultan Mahmud II whose approach to the 
ayans was obvious. But France did not prove more generous than before in territorial 
concessions and even resorted to double-dealings by contacting Ibrahim Pasha as a 
check on Ali. These put a constant strain on the second phase of the relations that 
compelled Ali Pasha to seek British adhesion.  
  The French failure to appease Ali Pasha and the loosening of their interest in 
him after the Tilsit Peace fully introduced the awaiting British into this complicated 
diplomacy. Driven by commercial as well as political motives, Britain would easily 
take over the mission of Greek liberation and act in tandem with the pasha. On the 
other hand British adherence enabled Ali to blackmail the French and extort the 
maximum gain from double-dealings. But he failed to calculate that the British 
would soon eliminate the French existence bypassing him. Indeed they managed to 
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accomplish it without the direct contribution of Ali Pasha depriving him his greatest 
leverage used at the beginning of the relations. In fact they accomplished this task by 
using their most significant advantage in Greek affairs which was their sympathy 
among the Greek inhabitants boosted by the British Philhellenes. This advantage 
assisted them in repelling the French from the islands and enabled them to directly 
engage in the Greek revolutionary movement more effectively. But this engagement 
would end up with the isolation of the pasha especially after the cessation of Parga. 
Now the independence of Ali Pasha was no longer considered identical to the 
independent Greece project in the eyes of the British authorities. His political 
isolation and vulnerability to the Porte’s aggression led him to seek alliance with the 
Greek revolutionaries of Philiki Hetairia. But they were not in favor of admitting the 
custody of the pasha.  
 Ali Pasha’s social stratagem regarding his envisaged independent state was 
mainly favoring the Greek language and culture as the basis of the social structure in 
his pashalık. Unlike the tribal characteristics of the Albanian elements that caused 
constant warfare and divisions among his subjects, the Greek language had a sort of 
unifying function since its daily use was common among Albanians and Turks. Then 
the significant role of the Greek language gave some exclusive advantages to the 
Greek population in the pashalık. By the encouragement of the pasha the wealthy 
Greek merchant Diaspora constantly repatriated some of their profits obtained from 
their international networks of commerce and contributed to the development of 
many Greek cities in Epirus, for the most part its capital Ioannina. The city became a 
center of the Greek renaissance serving as a hub of education and culture after the 
opening of several colleges and accumulation of Greek intellectuals. Many of the 
remarkable figures of the Greek revolution like Sakelarios, Psallidas, Kolettis who 
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also served in Ali Pasha’s court staffed the schools in Ioannina and took part in the 
task of disseminating revolutionary ideas.205 Thus a new Greek speaking literary 
class that had nationalistic sensitivities and strong connections with the Greek public 
was generated in these schools. Ali Pasha also had serious contributions to the 
linguistic transformation of the Greek language, which overlapped with the 
revolutionary movements. The Dimotiki dialect of Greek had been adopted as the 
language of Ali Pasha’s court where its written form was developed and its 
codification was accomplished.206 The adoption of this popular dialect as the official 
language together with the promotion of its development closed the huge gap 
between the ruling elite and the public paving the way for creating a national 
cohesion and consciousness. These developments display the hints of the very 
project of generating a Greek oriented independent kingdom very similar to that of 
the famous Rigas Fereos. Fereos had envisaged a Balkan-Asian state or a centralized 
Hellenic republic with various ethnicities and religions melted in the single pot of 
Greek cultural heritage.207 It is possible to contemplate that Fereos had some degree 
of influence on Ali Pasha in terms of uniting the distinct elements by the Greek 
culture. But it is most unlikely that Ali Pasha shared the foresights of Fereos 
advocating a democratic Hellenic state in which all elements, Muslims and 
Christians alike, would have the right to vote and participate in the administrative 
offices.  
 At the beginning of his relations with the west Ali Pasha was somehow 
rendered as the protagonist of this project of liberating Greece in the hands of an 
oriental despot. It is most likely that he was not always fully attached to this cause 
                                                 
205 Duane Koenig, A Report from the Ioanian Islands, December 1810, The journal of Modern History 
Vol:15, No:3 (Sep,1943),pp:223-226 
206 K.E Fleming, The Muslim Bonaparte, Diplomacy and Orienatalism in Ali Pasha’s Greece, 
Princeton 1999,p:63 
207 Dakin, p:29 
 102 
 
and gaining more wealth as well as expanding his domains was of higher priority for 
some time. Though he was linked to this project with loose ties he did not decline to 
fulfill the basic features of creating a Modern Greek nation. Then the ill fate of the 
ayans in the empire and the unexpectedly fast introduction of Britain to his region 
that almost isolated him and diminished the value of his cooperation made it 
inevitable to completely appropriate the Greek independence project. But it was not 
such a good timing since the British policy concerning Greece was no longer 
centered on his independence. In addition the impossibility of further foreign support 
and the resolution of the Porte to extirpate all ayans forced the pasha to seek an 
alliance with the Greek revolutionaries. But just like Britain they were in favor of his 
removal by the Porte and exploited him as a source of additional weaponry.  To sum 
up the diplomatic relations of Ali Pasha with Britain and France ended up with a 
state of political desolation when the Greek revolution matured enough to triumph on 
its own. Apart from the failure of the very project of his independence he even lost 
the means of sustaining his reign in the Ottoman imperial system as he lost his 
diplomatic ties with the great powers. 
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